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ABSTRACT

Ethical Problems In Connection With World Poverty
by
FAN Wing
Master of Philosophy

World economy has been doing well in recent decades even taking into account
the current financial crisis. However, there are even more people suffering from
poverty and related issues than earlier. I am going to discuss the issue of helping poor
people in the context of ethics.
In my thesis, I will firstly state the standard of absolute poverty, which will be
the main focus in the remainder of the text. Then, I will present the argument given by
a contemporary philosopher, Peter Singer, that urges us to give money to the poor
people. I will go through his argument and his analogy between saving a drowning
child and giving out our money for charity on poverty relief. Many people may think
his theory controversial and difficult to accept. Afterwards, I will present main
arguments against Singer. I will assess these arguments and claim that some of them
fail as criticisms of Singer’s central claims. However some do successfully point out
the flaws of Singer’s argument, and some actually aim at questioning the entire
discussion of poverty relief. I will try to present and assess the effectiveness of the
alternative arguments by other philosophers that avoid these criticisms and that try to
support the aid in a different way.
The main question in my thesis in whether we have any moral obligation to help
the poor people around the world. And if we have such duties, to what extent we are
obliged to do so. I will do the literature review on different arguments and try to give
my own opinions in different parts in my thesis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Nowadays, the world economy is doing relatively well. True, in the past decades,
many countries recorded large amount of inflation. There was a tsunami over the
world economy in 2008, every country suffered in this great depression. It was a very
large-scale recession, and indeed some countries even faced widespread difficulties.
It is a truism that many people feel anxious about the decrease of their own wealth.
Nevertheless, affluent countries are still generally speaking, very prosperous, at least
prosperous enough to face the hard times.
But on the same globe, there is another group of people. They often do not have
even enough food to live on. They do not get the minimum resources for sustaining
their lives. They lack the basic necessities that any human beings need. They live in
what can only be described as absolute poverty.

1.1 Poverty
Many people of course live in poverty, but what is poverty exactly? How severe
should the situation be that we have to give help? Generally, poverty is divided into
two kinds: relative poverty and absolute poverty.
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Relative poverty usually means being poor when compared to one’s neighbours,
or one’s fellow citizens. It is defined socially. It depends on the society and its
context. People living in relative poverty are those who live with the income much
lower than the medium income of their community or society. It may not be
necessary that these lowest income groups live without clean food, water or shelter.
But they are poor when compared to most of the people in their society. Their income
may not be enough for sustaining their lives when faced with the high price index in
their own economies. Therefore, these people may well suffer in their community.
In my thesis, I will put aside relative poverty, not because it is not worth our
concern, but because we need to go into different social contexts when tackling the
problems associated with relative poverty. There is another kind of poverty that is
universally described however, and this has to do with poverty in absolute terms.
Absolute poverty is defined in concrete terms by international organizations such as
the United Nations and the World Bank. In my thesis, I will talk about world poverty
in these absolute terms.
According to the World Bank, half of the world population is living in poverty,
and nearly a quarter is living in extreme poverty. The World Bank defines extreme
poverty as subsisting with US$1/day (or less) and moderate poverty as subsisting on
approximately US$2/day. According to their investigations, in 2001, there were 1.1
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billion in the world population living under US$1/day and 2.7 billion living under
$2/day. But the threshold of extreme poverty was revised last year. In 2008, the
World Bank changed the extreme poverty line to US$1.25/day. Currently there are
1.4 billion people living under this threshold. Lifting up the threshold is not going to
make more people fall in the trap. This is because the old standard was used for
decades. However it should have been revised even earlier. The economic growth in
the last decades did not lead to the relief of poverty. We are living well in affluent
counties. It is hard for us to imagine there are such a huge number of people who
cannot sustain their lives.
One may think that living in a poor country on US$1.25/day could be sufficient
to sustain their lives. But it is wrong to think this way. This indicator is calculated in
terms of PPP, which refers to “purchasing power parity.” The number is converted
into the equilibrium purchasing power in the US. That means if they are living in the
US, they live with only less than US$1.25 per day. And actually most of them are far
from US$1.25 a day. It is a very hard situation.
There is another indicator of absolute poverty which has been introduced by the
United Nations, “It is a condition characterized by severe deprivation of basic
human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter,
education, information and access to services.” The UN defines absolute poverty as
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the absence of any two of these basic human needs. These are so important for
sustaining their lives, especially the first few criteria: food, safe drinking water,
sanitation facilities, health, and shelter. However, the last three are generally
regarded as something important for human well-being but it is questionable whether
they should be regarded as the very basic needs. Yet disregarding these three dubious
requirements, the first few are undoubtedly life necessities. The rich do not have to
worry about lacking one of them. However, many people are in the condition that
without more than two of these essential needs. It is a matter of life and death.
World Poverty is spreading all over the world. It is mainly distributed in South
Asia, and in Africa. In 2004, about 40 percent of the households in Sub-Saharan area
were subsisting under the poverty line.1
Poverty is a state that persists. If the parents are poor, the family would not
suddenly become rich in the next generation. The children inherit poverty from their
parents. Young children and infants suffer a lot from poverty. They need lots of
nutrients for their growth. But this seems impossible to achieve for those living with
less than US$1 a day. Life expectancy is extremely low in countries in Africa. The
UNICEF, the United Nations Children's Fund, estimates that some 10 million
children under five-year-old die of the poverty-related causes around the globe.2 It is
1

Poverty. In Wikipedia [Web]. Retrieved May 2009, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poverty
Singer, Peter (2009). The Life You Can Save: Acting now to end world poverty. New York: Random
House. P. 5

2
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27,000 everyday, one every three seconds. But this number does not include the elder
children or adults. They die of malnutrition and some diseases which can be easily
cured in affluent countries. But they do not get these basic treatments or nutrients.

1.2 Objective
I am going to discuss the issue of world poverty in the context of morality. The
main question here is neither why there is poverty nor how to solve this ongoing evil.
But it does not mean that these two questions are not relevant, or will not be
mentioned. However, the core question I am going to address is whether we, as
affluent individuals, are obliged to give or not, and if yes, how far we should go. I
will discuss the issues about the duty to the poor and its limits. For the term
“poverty” in this paper, I mean the absolute poverty around the world. I will also
discuss the issue in the context of contemporary bioethics. Contemporary
philosopher Peter Singer wrote an article “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”3 in
1972, and many discussions afterwards are mainly based on his argument. I will go
through his arguments, and point out the criticisms he may face. Then, I will assess
those criticisms. I will argue that some criticisms are valid but some fail to refute
Singer’s argument. However, I will point out that there are fatal criticisms such as the

3

Singer, Peter (Spring 1972). Famine, Affluence, and Morality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1,
no. 3, 229-243.
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failure of the analogy and the over-demandingness of his argument. This makes his
claim much weaker, or comes close to refuting it. Moreover, I will search for other
arguments that support aid, and evaluate these pro-aid arguments by other
philosophers. I will argue that Garrett Cullity’s argument from beneficence can avoid
some criticisms of Singer. At the end of this thesis, I will reveal the general criticisms
against the aid activities. These anti-aid arguments are not based on any particular
philosophical basis, but rather relate to the whole issue of helping the poor. However,
I would argue many of these objections are linked to practical problems, and are
unsuccessful in undermining the requirement for beneficence. I will also point out
that these general and practical criticisms of aid can be met if the policies could be
planned and coordinated better. Therefore, in my conclusion, I will argue that we still
have to give some of our money for alleviating the global poverty.
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Chapter 2
Peter Singer’s Argument

Singer is a famous contemporary philosopher expert in practical ethics,
especially bioethics. In 1972, he published an article “Famine, Affluence, and
Morality”. He professed that we should give out all of our surplus money to the aid
agencies for alleviating the astounding situation of world poverty. Spending on
luxuries but not necessities is wrong morally. This is a very progressive claim, and is
very controversial. It aroused lots of discussions afterwards. And the discussions
spread widely between economists, social scientists, and philosophers. Some of them
support Singer’s claims, some reject them, and some expand the debate further. But
all these contentions are mostly based on Singer’s view. Therefore, it is better to
begin my thesis with Singer’s argument in some detail.
Singer’s argument starts the discussion about our moral obligation to help poor
people. Singer says that when we are spending money on luxury products, we should
consider there are large numbers of people on the other side of the world who are
suffering from extreme poverty. We are obliged to give the money for helping the
destitute and for saving people’s lives. According to this reasoning, the money spent
on things that we do not necessarily need should be given away. In common sense
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thinking, we think that giving our money to aid is charitable behaviour, and thus is
supererogatory. But Singer considers it to be an obligation rather than an act of
generosity. Regarding supererogatory acts, we are praised for them, but we are not
wrong if we do nothing (e.g., altruistic charitable activities). However, for a moral
obligation, we are strongly required to do it, and should not expect any special praise
for doing so. If we fail to do so, we are wrong and morally blamable. How can
Singer come to this controversial conclusion? Let’s go into details of his carefully
constructed argument.
He firstly suggests an assumption, which he thinks is hard or even not possible
to refute. The assumption is that any suffering from the lack of basic necessities like
food, clean water, shelter, sanitation facilities and medical care is bad.4 This is
simply for Singer, an unquestionable fact. And this is not dependent on any culture. It
is an evil universally. Anyone across the world without these basic human needs is in
a bad situation.
After starting with this undeniable assumption, he derives the Strong Principle:
“If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby
sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.”5
There is another version of this principle, which is the weak one, “If it is in our

4
5

(Singer, Spring 1972). P. 231
(Singer, Spring 1972). P. 231
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power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing
anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it.”6
There is the third version of this principle, which is the latest one. Singer makes
it in his latest book concerning world poverty. In The Life You can Save published in
early 2009, he introduces a moderate principle, “If it is in our power to prevent
something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything nearly as important, it
is wrong not to do so.” 7 The term “nearly as important” is quite vague.
Nevertheless, Singer leaves space here for people to think for themselves. He is
confident about the claim that there are many things that are clearly not nearly as
important as to save a child, although it is not explicitly claimed what this is.8
The weaker version, of course, is the least demanding one. The latest one is a bit
weaker than the strong version. However, in most philosophical papers discussing
the ideas proposed by Singer, it is generally the strong version of the principle that is
taken for discussion. And in this paper, I am also going to consider this stronger
version as the main one when discussing issues concerning Singer’s principle. If the
principle is mentioned without specification, I am talking about the stronger version.
The principle means that when we are able to prevent the occurrence of some
bad things which are just mentioned above, and by doing this we are not going to
6
7
8

(Singer, Spring 1972). P. 231
(Singer, 2009). P.15-16
(Singer, 2009). P. 17-18.
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sacrifice something which is morally more important, then we should offer our hands
in order to help. Because the assumption says those things are so bad, and if we
could prevent them from happening, then why not?
Singer points out that the argument is not going to rely on any specific
standpoint in ethics. It is a general moral principle. This principle is not based on a
utilitarian point of view. It is not a Kantian one either, nor an approach of virtue
ethics. It is not grounded in any particular ethical theory. It is because it is derived
from the most basic human needs on the necessities to sustain lives. “Death due to
hunger is bad” has no controversies between different ethnic groups or nationalities.
These are universal evils. But it does not mean that he is appealing here to a Kantian
approach. The universality is because of its evilness for the whole human kind. Being
a principle apart from special theories does not mean that it is contrary to these
theories. It applies to all human beings no matter what one’s moral beliefs are. It is
therefore a general moral principle. As a basic moral principle apart from any
specific ethical theories, it is not going to evade rejection from particular theories. It
faces even more refutations. It invites criticisms from different moral beliefs. But it
goes with a broader applicability, which is Singer’s aim.
The principle itself is only a little bit abstract. Singer gives an example for its
application. It is the famous example of a drowning child. Just imagine we are in a
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hurry to work or to school in the morning, and we are dressed well. The suit is new,
the shoes are expensive. However, imagine that when we are walking past a shallow
pond we find that there is a child who is going to drown in the water. Although we
are rushing to work, and are all dressed-up, we should jump into the water and pull
the child out of the pond. It might well mean being late and getting our clothes wet
and ruined, but it is not important when compared to the life of that child. It is simply
absurd to say, “No! My shoes are more important!” If people were to react in this
way, without any additional sufficient reason, we could well blame them for being
inhumane.
But this is not the end of Singer’s argument. He goes on to build an analogy
between the drowning child and global poverty, as he thinks both situations are
basically the same. Singer goes forward here by claiming that there are drowning
people around the globe. They are in danger. They can easily lose their lives. They
are in desperate need. When we are spending money on something that is not
necessary, why don’t we use this money to save those dying people? According to
this reasoning there is no excuse to buy a bottle of water while tap water is free and
accessible in affluent countries. There is no reason to buy expensive and fuel-wasting
Ferrari while other cheaper brands are available. There should not be preference for
an expensive mechanical watch rather than a cheaper and actually more accurate
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quartz watch. The money spent on luxuries can be given to poverty relief
organizations. It is the way to save people 10,000 miles away. Singer thinks that
these organizations can do more if they had more money.9 Therefore, he urges us to
give away our surplus to the charities for alleviating poverty around the world. He
says if we accept that we ought morally to save the sinking child in the shallow pond,
we do have the same moral obligation to save those who are on the other side of the
world.
People may think that there are differences in the two cases. It is different
because the child is drowning near me, I can save him with my own hands. However
poverty is a worldwide issue, it is far removed from us. And there are so many
people that could help the poor, my effort is not that important for saving. It is
usually the way that people may think. But Singer says there should not be such
excuses. He states two implications of his argument, namely that proximity and the
number of people involved are irrelevant. He gives reasons to defend these two
implications.
Firstly, he claims that there should not be any difference because of proximity.
If we accept the “impartiality, universalizability, equality”10 there should not be a
difference if the child I can save is my neighbour’s child or a child that is thousands

9
10

(Singer, 2009) P. 5
(Singer, Spring 1972). P. 232
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miles away from me. Impartiality, universalizability, equality are values that are
generally accepted around the world. If we also accept these values, we could not say
there is justifiable discrimination between neighbour’s child and an African child that
we do not know.
Singer defends his second implication afterwards. He admits that there might be
psychological difference when people think there are others involved in the situation
like us but who at the same time do nothing. We may feel less guilty of our inaction
when we can point to others in the same position who have done nothing. Yes, for
Singer, it is a psychological difference, but it does not make any real difference to
our moral obligation. If we see other people, no further away than us, who have also
noticed the child but doing nothing, we should not feel less guilty. It is absurd to
think numbers lessen obligation. People may think it as an “ideal excuse for
inactivity”. But Singer says that most of the major evils, such as poverty,
overpopulation, pollution, are problems in which everyone is almost equally
involved.11
Therefore, he claims that there are no differences of responsibility that would
depend on proximity and the number of people involved. If these two implications
are true, then for Singer, it is so obvious that we should help the global poor, no
matter how far those sufferers are. And everyone on Earth is involved in the same
11

(Singer, Spring 1972). P. 232
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way as the one who sees the drowning child. So, everyone has the same
responsibility to save people in poverty wherever one is in the world. Everyone in
affluent countries should donate money to the charity organizations working on
poverty relief across nations, like UNICEF or Oxfam.
For charity, we do think that it is morally good to do so, but we think there is
nothing wrong if we are not giving. However, for Singer, it is not merely charity or
beneficence, and it is not supererogatory12. It is a moral obligation. We are morally
wrong if we fail to meet its demand. We ought to give away the money for famine
relief.
Even if we accept what Singer urges, the question remains: how much should
we give? As Singer indicates, we all have the equal responsibility to the global poor.
We should donate money continuously to help them if that does not require
sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance. Singer urges us to give as
much as possible until our sacrifice is of comparable moral importance. It seems so
vague, but it is a matter of principle. Anyway, Singer does give some concrete
examples. In another article, “The Solution to World Poverty”, he does mention the
question of “how does my philosophy break down in dollars and cents?” 13
According to the Conference Board, a nonprofit economic research organization, in
12

(Singer, Spring 1972). P. 235
Singer, Peter (September 05, 1999). “The Singer Solution to World Poverty”. The New York Times
Magazine, Retrieved March 13 2008, from
http://www.nytimes.com/library/magazine/home/19990905mag-poverty-singer.html , P.4

13
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the US, an American household with an annual income of US$50,000 spends around
US$30,000 on necessities every year. 14 So, this household should make the
donations to help the world’s poor as close as possible to US$20,000. However,
Singer thinks the standard of US$30,000 for necessities holds also for those
households that have income of US$100,000 a year. That means they should give as
close to US$70,000 as possible. For Singer, the formula is so simple: “whatever
money you’re spending on luxuries, not necessities should be given away.”15
It is very demanding, and thus, controversial. It is, for most people, hard to
accept Singer’s position that we should give away all of our surplus even if we are
ready to help those in global poverty. But Singer himself also anticipates its
controversial aspect in the article: “the uncontroversial appearance of the principle
just stated is deceptive. If it were acted upon, even in its qualified form, our lives, our
societies, and our world would be fundamentally changed.”16 Singer mentions that
even if we adopted his principle moderately17, it would still make great changes to
our lives. But it is worth doing so.
He admits that we may not be psychologically altruistic enough to make it
plausible to sacrifice that much for strangers. It is right on the fact of human nature.
However, he points out that this fact cannot lead to any moral conclusion of
14
15
16
17

(Singer, 1999). P.4
(Singer, 1999). P.4
(Singer, Spring 1972). P. 231
(Singer, Spring 1972). P. 241
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inactivity18. My thesis is going explore whether we, the affluent people, are morally
required to help the poor. What we are not willing to do, does not affect the moral
requirement of what we ought to do. Unless we can show his argument’s invalidity,
or prove its unsoundness, we could not refute his argument. Otherwise, we are failing
to live morally decent lives.

18

(Singer, 1999). P.5
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Chapter 3
Criticisms on Singer and Evaluations on Criticisms

After explaining Singer’s argument, you may feel that he is too radical in his
conclusions.

This is the feeling of many people. Singer himself also notices that,

but does not regard it as an important challenge to him. He says, ‘…the way people
do in fact judge has nothing to do with the validity of my conclusion.’19 He thinks his
argument follows from the principle that we ought to save those lives if by doing this
there would not be any serious risk to us. It must stand unless the principle is rejected,
or the arguments shown to be unsound. Saying ‘it is too drastic, too radical’ does
nothing to reject the argument logically. There may be a great impact on our ordinary
moral codes. However, ordinary moral rules do not mean they are the best rules ever.
I think that it is alright to change the codes, if Singer’s argument is proved to be true
and valid. Therefore, we should criticize his argument in another way rather than just
call it a drastic one. But, how to do it?
Actually, there are a number of ways. In this part, I am going to show various
criticisms against Singer’s arguments raised by philosophers. However, I would
discuss the criticisms mainly from Neera K. Badhwar’s article “International aid:
When giving becomes a vice”. It is not because she is the only philosopher to make
19

(Singer, Spring 1972). P. 236
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those criticisms, but because she includes most of the main criticisms against
Singer’s argument. Some of the points she considers are also mentioned by other
philosophers. But let me skip listing out all these philosophers and use Badhwar’s
article as the main reference for discussing most of the criticisms here. Some of the
criticisms point to Singer’s analogy, some are directed against his stressing the giving
of money rather than using other means to help, and some are aimed at his own
behaviour. I will go into details of these criticisms of his position. And then for each
criticism against Singer, I will also analyze and evaluate their views and argue that
some of them are successful, but some of them fail to refute Singer’s stand. At the
end of this part, we will see that Singer’s argument will be in a hard position. The
failure of his analogy between the drowning child and global poor makes his
argument much weaker. He may have to change some part of his argument,
otherwise it would be easily overthrown.

3.1.1 Monomania
Badhwar thinks that Singer’s thesis is monomaniac 20 . However, what is
monomaniac? Monomaniac means that someone is irrationally focused on a single
subject or class of subjects. Badhwar finds Singer’s stand focused too much on world

20

Badhwar, Neera K. “International aid: When giving becomes a vice”. Issue on Justice and Global
Politics, Vol. 23, winter 2006, P.73
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poverty without good reason while there are lots of other evils going on. She also
thinks that even if we have to help the poor, Singer has put too much emphasis on
giving out money and time, and has treated this means as the only way to help.

Monomania on Money and Time
In her article “International aid: When giving becomes a vice”, Badhwar states
that the world offers very rich variety of values that can make a life morally good.
The world offers so many ways that could lead to morally good lives. There are
many goals worth pursuing, many personalities worth developing, many ideals worth
cherishing and following. Let me elaborate more. We would not deny that a good
person must be to some extent a beneficent person. But being beneficent does not
mean simply restricted to huge contributions of time or money towards aid agencies
in order to solve the problem of global poverty. A beneficent person can help the
aged, help sick people with fatal diseases, help orphans, or help save endangered
animals. And to alleviate poverty, there is never only one way to achieve this end.
We can give money to charity undoubtedly. However, we can also be volunteers to
work with the poverty relief agencies. We can promote and provide information to
people or communities around us, we can report the news concerning poverty across
the world, and we can also conduct research to find the best way for poverty relief.
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Singer seems to be putting too much emphasis on giving out our time, and especially
our money, while there are so many possible ways to help the global poor.

Monomania on Poverty
Singer’s moral ideal is monomaniac not only with respect to the contribution of
money and time, but also on the relief of poverty. Badhwar thinks that there are
abundant bad things, abundant evils happening throughout the world, such as
ongoing and unjust wars, absolutism and totalitarian rules, fatal and wide-spreading
diseases, astonishing environmental crises, and deteriorating pollution etc. These are
all the major evils on the planet. They are at least not smaller evil than the issue of
global poverty. However, Singer seems only concerned about the issue of poverty.
For him, giving help to poverty relief and prevention is the only way of being
beneficent. In fact, the relief of poverty is only one special interest, just like a special
interest of fighting fire or rebuilding houses destroyed by tornadoes21. People may
like to trace their own special interest rather than follow Singer’s urge. The other
kind of interest can also lead to a beneficent or morally decent life. There is no point
to treat the prevention of poverty as a more important interest than others. Choosing
one over the others without a good reason then, makes Singer’s argument a
monomaniac one.
21

(Badhwar, Winter 2006). P.74
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Sufficiently Beneficent
To be a morally decent person may involve being beneficent to certain extent.
However, being beneficent does not mean only giving away our surplus money and
time for alleviation of global poverty. One who fails to contribute to poverty relief
activities can still be a beneficent person. A beneficent person need not contribute as
much money and time to aid agencies as possible. She does not need to do a
tremendous contribution or action against poverty in order to be beneficent. One may
contribute one’s effort on reducing discrimination, relieving pollution on the planet,
promoting activities against global warming, or taking care of the disabled and
elderly. Without being involved in any poverty reduction works, one can also be a
very beneficent person undoubtedly. One can still be sufficiently beneficent if one’s
contributions to institutionalized charity are small or occasional22. Helping the poor
may be sufficient to make one’s life beneficent. But it does not mean helping poor
people is necessary to be sufficiently beneficent. There are various ways of
beneficence.

3.1.2 Evaluation of the Monomania Objection
Badhwar thinks that Singer unreasonably focuses on the issue of world poverty
among various tremendous dreadful evils on the planet. She argues that poverty is
22

(Badhwar, Winter 2006). P.76
- 21 -

only one special interest among all, it is not necessary to put it as the only one or as
the most important one. She also thinks that even if we are morally required to help
the poor, it does not mean one is required to give one’s entire surplus to charity.
There are abundant ways to offer our hand to those desperate people.
At first we may think that Singer is not reasonable to choose poverty rather than
other ongoing evils. However, after scrutiny I think his argument is not a
monomaniac one. When we look through his argument clearly, we would find that he
does not ban our help on other tragedies.
Let me recall the principle introduced by Singer, “If it is in our power to prevent
something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable
moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.”23 For Singer, this principle applies
both to the case of drowning child and the issue of global dire poverty. Pulling the
child from sinking in the pool is similar to giving away our money upon the basic
needs to charities which are working to alleviate ongoing worldwide poverty. By
giving out one’s surplus for relieving activities, the lives of those people living in
desperate need can be saved. Singer urges us to save those people who are in dire
poverty. Does this claim imply that Singer is monomaniac? I do not think so.
Singer gives us the guidance by introducing the principle. His presentation is
clear that we have to consider the situations when we have to decide what the correct
23
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conduct should be. He does not devalue other ongoing major evils across nations.
However, the problem of poverty is so enormous. It affects about one-fifth to
one-forth of the global population living under US$1 per day who live in absolute
poverty. Under such circumstances they cannot sustain their lives. This is one among
the greatest tragedies that are happening in the world. The poor populations are found
on every continent, and especially in Africa. Singer never says poverty relief is the
only beneficence that is worth pursuing. It is not the only calamity that requires our
concerns. Following Singer’s principle, you can take up other relief works if you
think that they are morally worthier than alleviating global poverty. The key thing
here is to weigh different goals and see if you find that there are some other things
which are “of comparable moral importance.” Otherwise, you should give your help
on poverty relief works rather than other less important tasks. He definitely chooses
absolute poverty out of all of the ongoing evils on the earth. He urges us to give for
the alleviation of this evil. But this does not imply he thinks other evils are not worth
relieving. He does not deny other benevolent actions. Singer would not say “no” if
you spend the money on other charitable movements with more significance for you,
honestly and genuinely. Therefore, I think the accusation of monomania is not
tenable.
For the minor charge of monomania on money as well as time, I will also say
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that it is not a cogent criticism. Singer advises people to give away the surplus wealth,
other than expenses for the basic necessities. I would say that it is a comprehensible
and reasonable pleading. It is because in most affluent countries, people have their
own occupations, and their backgrounds under conditions of great variety. The
common factor between them is that they earn money, with the amounts that are
much higher than what is required to sustain their lives. They can certainly give away
some of their wealth. And giving out their surplus money to charitable organizations
could probably be the most efficacious and easiest way to motivate the affluent
people to support the relief works around the world. They do not have to become
involved in saving poor people in person, and they do not have to go across the
Atlantic and stay for years in African countries, nor do they have to abandon their
jobs and their regular lives. They can just give the money to the transnational
organizations working on poverty alleviation, such as UNICEF and Oxfam. By
donating money, they can save people on the other side of the world while at the
same time staying at home and watching television. If you wish to leave your
affluent lives and cross oceans and do the works yourselves, it would be perfectly
fine for Singer, or even better. He does not discourage people to be the life-saving
volunteers or to get a job working on this. But for most people, it is not possible to
do it this way. Therefore, it is conceivable that Singer introduces the easiest way to
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follow, in order to convince as many people as possible. I think he would certainly
appreciate if there were someone who would say, “No, I would go to Africa. I would
rather choose to give the assistance by my own hand rather giving my hand indirectly
through Oxfam. But these people are in small proportion. For the majority, he
chooses to urge them in a simple way, which is to give away money. It does not
indicate that Singer only wants us to help the poor by giving out our money. He is
not monomaniacal on this.

3.2.1 Misanthropic Ideal
Badhwar also thinks that Singer’s moral ideal is deeply misanthropic. Singer
turns a blind eye to people’s interests. Being beneficent is morally good.
Undoubtedly, it is worth pursuing. However, as stated previously, helping the poor is
only one special interest among all. Being beneficent, at the same time, is only one
goal that is worth pursuing in our lives. There are plenty of values which are worth
following or accomplishing. There are plenty of goals which make our lives worth
living. Our interests vary between different people with different backgrounds,
purposes and personalities. But Singer totally ignores one’s vocation, moral
personalities, individual histories, life projections and goals24. We have our own life
plans. We may want to develop our careers and strive for success. We may put most
24
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of our efforts on academic research, as Singer does. We may like to live a simple life
in the countryside. We would do something we love to do and something that is
worth doing for us, rather than giving all our leisure time and surplus wealth to help
those strangers in chronic poverty, although it is morally decent to do so.
At the same time, being morally decent is only one among all of our concerns.
In reality we do have other concerns. Although we do not refuse to be a morally
decent person, there are abundant ways to achieve this decency. Singer fails to
identify the variety of moral ideals and of individualities. He arbitrarily ranks poverty
alleviating activities by extensive self-sacrifice as the highest and very likely as the
only moral value.
Badhwar points out that Singer is generally recognized as a utilitarian.
Utilitarians, as well as most of us, would believe that the pursuit of happiness is ‘the
attempt to forge a life that is objectively meaningful, worthwhile and enjoyable to the
individual concerned25’. However, Badhwar thinks that Singer’s theory claims full
allegiance from all of us here and is not compatible with one’s happiness. His ideal
denies that we can use our money and time to lead a life that we think pleasant and
significant. His demands ignore the importance of wealth creation, lets alone one’s
integrity and moral diversity. Actually, following his position may probably result in
much unhappiness.
25
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3.2.2 Evaluation on the Misanthropic Ideal
It is not deniable that Singer’s pleading for our response to the destitute is very
demanding. Singer himself also admits that even the weaker version could make a
great change to our ordinary lives and usual moral conducts.26 But this would not
forthrightly make Singer’s ideal a misanthropic one. Singer calls on the rich to
donate their income above what they spend on basic necessities. After satisfying their
basic needs, they have to think about whether they should give away the surplus
wealth or spend on their own yearnings. Singer is asking for quite a large
contribution from all of us, the affluent people. However, we ought to give, when
there is not anything of comparably moral importance. If one is thinking that buying
a new and expensive second car would be very nice, he should recognize that there
are many people who are suffering from lack of food, shelters, clean water etc. He
has to weigh these factors before he decides where his money is to be spent. If he
eventually decides to spend on a second car, it could be acceptable. But he should
rationally provide a good reason. He has to show the moral importance of purchasing
a new second car is greater than saving the destitute human beings from dying.
Singer asks us to think before we use our money. Maybe Singer is quite demanding
but he is right that most of our money is being spent on something we do not need.
Obviously, the second car is not a must for sustaining our lives. Someone would
26
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extend Singer’s argument to some extreme circumstances. They may ask whether we
should help people from dying of a lack of the basic necessities or whether we should
save people from mental sickness. Or indeed whether we should give away our
surplus to save, let say, 10 lives in Africa, or to cure my mum for lung cancer. These
are hard questions to answer. But, as I see it, posting these difficulties in human
decisions could not refute Singer’s argument wholly.
In his latest book The Life You can Save published in early 2009, he tries to
show that there are many circumstances which are not that controversial. It is
unlikely that everything would make people in a position of moral dilemma. He
introduces a moderate principle, “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from
happening, without sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is wrong not to do
so.”27 It includes a vague component “nearly as important”. Singer explains his use
of this unclear phrase because he wants to leave the decision to you. But Singer
believes that there is something which is not that controversial. Something is clearly
not necessary and is even exceptionally luxurious for us. For example, Larry Page
and Sergey Brin who are the cofounders of Google, purchased a Boeing 767 for a
private feast, and spent millions of US dollars for ornaments28. Moreover, in the US,
or any other affluent countries, people spend lots of money to buy new clothes. But it
27
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is reported that some of these purchases have not even been worn before they are
thrown away. In the daily household garbage, a large number of foods are wasted
everyday. People buy excessive things that they do not need. There is something that
is being wasted without doubt.
But Singer lets you make your own judgment on things. If you honestly think
that there is something more important or nearly as important, Singer would ask you
to do it first. If you find anything that is not clearly outweighed in moral importance
by the poverty relief activities, you can do it first. You can choose depending upon
your own situation.29
Singer tries to make things less demanding and make it easier for people to
accept them. He is trying to be “anthropic”, in Badhwar’s words.
Badhwar thinks that Singer’s ideal is misanthropic because it disregards
people’s interest and happiness. It is perhaps true when “anthropic” refers only to
personal happiness of the affluent people. But I do not agree with this self-regarding
interpretation of “anthropic”. Anthropic ideal is to be concerned with the well-being
of all humankind, not of a particular group of people. Although Singer’s proposal is
not a utilitarian suggestion, Singer’s concern can actually increase the general
happiness of everyone. The general happiness here is not taken into account for the
purpose of Singer’s claim. He does not need to rely on the concept of happiness here.
29
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His argument works perfectly well without using the concept of happiness. However,
if someone is trying to criticize Singer’s argument for not being compatible with
happiness, I would argue that he is wrong to do so. And actually I think it is hard to
say that a person motivating people to save as many lives as possible can be called a
misanthropic person. What Singer is doing here is everything about the well-being of
human beings, about their happiness, although his argument is not a utilitarian one.
However, Badhwar can still argue that the general happiness cannot be achieved
if the happiness of the rich was ignored. But this is why Singer tries to lower the
standard. He tries to be less demanding and respect the happiness of the rich. He calls
for up to 1% of income from the relatively wealthier people for their personal
contribution. It is not demanding indeed. But many people from the developed
countries are still far from this standard. I am not pointing to the US people, but
everyone in wealthy countries.
If this kind of argument would be to a certain extent a misanthropic one, than
maybe we should ask ourselves how to be an anthropic person if we are seeing so
many people dying from hunger? I do not want to make Singer’s argument more
controversial here. We simply cannot save everyone. I just want to state that it is not
appropriate to say it is a misanthropic ideal.
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3.3.1 Ignore Property Rights
Another criticism that is raised by many philosophers is Singer’s ignorance of
human rights, especially the generally accepted conception of property rights.
Singer urges us to donate money to aid agencies for the relief works of world
poverty, rather than using those money to pursue our own goals or interests that seem
worthy to us. This idea is different with our common knowledge of human rights.
Especially, it ignores the property rights that we are generally believed to have. We
are entitled to our own property, including salaries for our wages or bequests that we
might get in a will. We usually and definitely believe that we have the right to own
and use them. Because they are mine, I am the owner of the wealth I have got. I am
the only one who has the right to possess, to expand, or to distribute my own
property. And our knowledge of property rights also encourages us to spend them in
compliance with our own interests. According to the general concept of property
rights, just according to common sense, we can spend them freely. For example, I
can buy a luxurious yacht, spend my money on an expensive dinner in a fancy hotel,
or purchase the latest fashionable clothes without anyone’s consent or permission.
That is the reason why we work hard to create more income and wealth. To use my
money according to my wishes is the motivation for my endeavour to commit myself
to my occupation. But apparently, Singer’s views do not allow me to do so. Singer
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calls me an immoral person if I do not follow his view and give away a reasonable
proportion of my wealth to help those suffering in desperate impoverishment. I have
been informed by common sense to possess the innate right to use my own property.
But, at the same time, I do not have it actually, because I am strictly obliged to give
most of it to charity. I cannot spend it on luxuries. I cannot develop my life plan with
my surplus. It is even not appropriate for me to even buy a bottle of water while tap
water is free of charge and easily accessible. The creation of wealth, for Singer,
seems to be merely a means for giving it away. However, I will argue later that the
wealth-creation is, even not helping in lessening the number of people from chronic
hunger, avoiding more people to fall below the threshold of absolute poverty. Singer
is widely criticized here on his ignorance to human rights, particularly the common
and basic concept of property rights.30

3.3.2 Evaluation on Ignorance of Poverty Rights
Some may think that Singer is totally disregarding the general concept of
property rights. It seems Singer is taking things away from them. It is not proper to
say they are doing something immoral while spending on stuff that they desire and
enjoy. They may think that Singer is unreasonable in this argument.
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not the case. Singer does not have to be disregarding the property rights that every
human being possesses.
Singer does not demand the unlimited maximization of the general happiness
from us. Nor do his views need to violate the common concept of rights or any other
principles that people, no matter consequentialists or not, may think of comparable
moral importance.31 It is all the matter of comparison. Just as I mentioned previously,
you can choose between possessing your own rights of using your money on things
that meet your basic needs or give them to charity in order to save lives. If you think
that it is moral important or nearly as important to keep your rights not violated (as
opposed to saving people’s lives from dire poverty) it is suitable for you to do so. But
of course this implies that you have to be genuine and sincere in your moral
judgment. After every deliberation, if you still think that property rights are more
morally sustainable than Singer’s argument then it is morally acceptable to keep your
hold on your own rights.

Therefore, given all this, I do not see the validity on the

criticism saying that Singer neglects human rights.

3.4.1 Singer’s Own Donations
Badhwar states in her article that Singer himself does not strictly follow what he
himself urges. Her argument suggests that Singer suffers from a tendency toward
31
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both doublethink and doublespeak32. This argument is an ad hominem one. It points
to the situation of the person advocating a given claim. However it is relevant here
nevertheless. As a passionate defender of this approach, Singer truly believes in his
own advocacy. However, he himself cannot live up to the level he mentioned. He
does in fact give 20-25% of his income to aid agencies. It is quite remarkable for
anyone to do so. But it is still far removed from what he says in his argument that we
should give the entire surplus which is not required for his or his family’s basic needs.
Badhwar denounces Singer here that he seems to be guilty of hypocrisy

and

misleading people into thinking that he is living up to his claim and that he is
inconsistent between his words and deeds.
Not only indulging in doublethink and doublespeak, he also makes further
compromises over the course of time. He reduces the minimum requirement to 10%
of their income in order to be moral decent in one book, and, later, further reduces it
to 1% in another book33. The fact that he gives that concession creates the impression
that he fails in his argument.

3.4.2 Evaluation on Singer’s Own Donations
It is hard to live up to Singer’s standard, no doubt. And it is quite annoying fact
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that the great advocate himself cannot follow the actions that he calls on us to do. But
it is also true that Singer himself is already very sincere to his argument. 20-25% of
income is not a small number for a professor in Princeton University. It is not
deniable that Singer is not doing strictly to his announced position. It makes people
think it is quite impossible to fellow the standard if Singer himself also fails to live
up to this level. However, it does not logically lead to the failure of his argument.
Singer is not lowering the standard for his own sake. He wants people feel
poverty relief is not that demanding and that they should be more willing to give
more. He simply wants more people start to give away at least some of their income.
He also indicates in many papers and his latest book The Life You Can Save that most
Americans think that they and the US government gives a lot for global poverty
relief. They think they are one of the most charitable nations on foreign aid, no
matter on community or governmental level. But Singer says that this is not the truth.
The US is the richest country on Earth. They must be doing very well on aid. If you
believe in this way, you are absolutely wrong. The Americans think that the US
government is spending 20% for foreign aid every year, which they think is too much.
Many of them believe that 10% is acceptable. However, the actual amount is less
than 1%, more precisely 0.18% of their Gross National Income (GNI). It is among
the least benevolent countries when giving for foreign assistance is calculated as
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percentage of Country’s GNI. It is much far from what their citizens find as the
reasonable percentage for foreign assistance works. 34 According to the Official
development assistance (ODA)35 statistics from the same research by DAC36 from
OECD37, the total amount of the official development assistance given by the US
government is the highest among all countries.38 Although it is only 0.18% of the
GNI, the US gives US$22.7 billions in 2006 for foreign assistance which is nearly
double the amount given by the UK in the second place. Singer may find it is much
better if the US government gives up to 0.7% of the GNI (the percentage urged by

34

(Singer, 2009). P. 33-35.
Singer quoted in his book the statistic from OECD. It is data from Statistical Annex of the 2007
Development Co-operation Report, by Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). However the data were not found by the link provided by Singer. The summary of the 2007
Development Co-operation Report can be found in the OECD website.
OECD, OECD Journal on Development: Development Co-operation Report 2007. Retrieved July 4,
2009, from Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Web site:
http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,3343,en_2649_34447_40056608_1_1_1_37413,00.html
More updated data can be obtained from Statistical Annex of the 2009 Development Co-operation
Report on OECD website.
OECD, Statistical Annex of the 2009 Development Co-operation Report. Retrieved July 4, 2009, from
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Web site:
http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3343,en_2649_34447_1893129_1_1_1_1,00.htmlhttp://www.oecd
.org/document/9/0,3343,en_2649_34447_1893129_1_1_1_1,00.html
35
Official development assistance (ODA) is a statistic compiled by the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to
measure aid. The Official Website, Retrieved July 4 2009, from http://www.oecd.org/
36
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is a committee under the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD). It is a forum for selected member states to discuss issues
surrounding aid, development and poverty reduction in developing countries.
Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC). Retrieved July 4, 2009, from Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development Web site:
http://www.oecd.org/about/0,3347,en_2649_33721_1_1_1_1_1,00.html
37
OECD is Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. It is an organization
consisting of 30 developed countries committed to democracy and the market economy. It is founded
to support sustainable economic growth, boost employment, assist other countries' economic
development and maintain financial stability.
The government from different countries can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common
problems, identify good practices, and co-ordinate domestic and international policies.
The Official Website, Retrieved July 4 2009, from http://www.oecd.org/
38
OECD, Statistical Annex of the 2009 Development Co-operation Report. Retrieved July 4, 2009,
from Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Web site:
http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3343,en_2649_34447_1893129_1_1_1_1,00.html
- 36 -

the UN) every year.
Someone would contest this calculation as they believe the American people are
doing very well in private giving. However, together with the non-governmental
assistance, the aid money that comes on average from the US community is only
0.25%. It means only 25cents of each US$100 they are earning.39 It is still far away
from that of many prosperous countries. Therefore, Singer tries to urge people to
contribute more. Even if he says 1% is enough, yet the Americans are still living far
behind this standard. Singer thinks that the affluent people can do better.

3.5.1 Criticism on the Analogy
The most controversial part of Singer’s argument is the analogy between
helping a drowning child and giving money to aid agencies. His argument is based
heavily on this analogy. He finds that giving away all one’s surplus wealth to relieve
the world poverty is strictly analogous to rescuing a sinking child from a shallow
pond. If we agree about that and that we ought to help this sinking child in the
shallow pond, then according to Singer we should then also agree that we ought to
give away our surplus to aid agencies that are working for the global poverty
alleviation activities, such as UNICEF or Oxfam.
The argument is based on the similarity between these two cases. However, if
39
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there are flaws in the analogy, the grounds of his position would be shaken, if not
overthrown. Singer seems to be so confident about his analogy. He thinks we can get
the same judgment from both cases. Let me examine if he is right on this or not.

Form of analogy: a simple thought experiment
The form of the argument is simple. Singer firstly introduces his principle and
applies it to the situation of the drowning child. The child is in a very dangerous
position. Then, we make judgments on this scenario that it is something really bad
that is happening. We must help him immediately if we are able to do so, and helping
him would not cause any significant harm to us. Therefore, we find that the principle
introduced by Singer is applicable to this case. It is an acceptable principle because it
matches our moral intuition to this emergency situation. So, we accept that “If it is in
our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing
anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.

40

”

We accept the principle and we agree with it because we intuitively find that we
are wrong to refuse to help to the drowning child. Now, Singer tries to apply this
principle to another situation, that of world poverty. He thinks that the situations in
both cases are similar to each other. Giving away one’s surplus money is genuinely
analogous offering one’s hand to the drowning child in the shallow pond. There are
40
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many people who are suffering from dire poverty, miserable starvation, absence of
medical care, lack of clean drinking water, insufficient education, inaccessibility of
information and services etc. They are in desperate status. They need instantaneous
assistance in order to escape from death caused by absolute poverty. And we can do
something, by giving our money, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral
importance. So we make a judgment on this situation, the same judgment as before.
According to the principle drawn from the drowning child example, we should
reason in the same way to reach the same conclusion, which is ‘we ought morally to
do it’. Singer believes that we do not have to sacrifice much. Helping those people
would not cause any harm to us. We have a moral obligation to donate money to aid
agencies for poverty relief in order to save their lives. This is the analogy which
Singer’s argument is based heavily on.
The problem of this format of analogy is whether the two situations that we
make judgments of are equivalent or not, whether the principle successfully applies
to both situations or not. However, Neera Badhwar, and some other philosophers,
point out Singer’s failure to identify the differences between emergency and ongoing
evils.

- 39 -

Immediacy or directness
The first thing to state here is that the immediacy or directness is not the same in
the two scenarios. This point is that the immediacy and directness in the case of
helping the drowning child are different from the case of donating money to the aid
agencies.
In the case of drowning child, the need of the child is urgent and clear. When we
are walking past the shallow pond and see the child in immediate danger, we can
help the sinking child in person directly. There is a particular person we are going to
help. We know there is that child we are saving but not any other. Cullity thinks that
“beneficence involves responding to the needs of particular individuals; it is different
from the kind of generalized philanthropy that reacts to other people’s need in
general.”41
However, Singer’s conclusion that we should donate money to the aid agencies
is neither immediate nor direct. We just give money to the charity association. It is
not as if there is any particular individual I am going to help. We do not know who
would get the help base on the money that is given by us. We do not know their name,
their face, or the places that they are living. The relief those poor people received are
delivered by the aid agencies. Our roles here are indirect and not anything like being
immediate. It means there are differences of immediacy and directness between
41
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saving a drowning child and donating money to aid agencies.

Emergencies vs. ongoing evils
Badhwar criticizes Singer that he is not able to distinguish emergencies and the
ongoing evil. We can accept to the proposition of saving a drowning child. It does
not pose any serious risk to us. We do not have to scarify anything of comparably
moral importance. And we do kindly accept his principle. But it cannot be applied to
the situation of world poverty. They are different.
In the situation of drowning child, there is an emergency to save him. Does it
mean that there is no urgency on the issue of world poverty? No. But it is a very
short period emergency or accident in the case of drowning child. His need is instant,
urgent and immediate. It is transient. We do not have any further responsibility on
that child after rescuing him from the pool. Or maybe we have to send him to the
hospital, but that is all. It is a short-lived, one off incident. And in this case, we can
save him directly, and we know that there is a particular individual I am saving.
However, poverty around the world is not like this.

There is a chain of long

term circumstances. It is an ongoing evil. There are some who are in urgent and
desperate needs undoubtedly. But it is somehow different. The poverty across notions
is not a short-lived emergency like the drowning child in front of me. We cannot save
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the poor people one by one directly. There is no particular person we are going to
salvage. We do not know their names, their faces, their backgrounds, and anything
else. All we know about is that they are living in very bad circumstances.
According to Singer’s argument, we can accept that we ought to save the child,
and that we are obliged to give away our surplus. We should not spend our money on
things that are not necessary. Accordingly we should not spend our money on
fashionable clothes, large houses, extravagant dinners, quality hi-fi systems,
vacations outside one’s country, expensive cars, or even a bottle of distilled water, a
cup of coffee from Starbucks, or other luxury items such as works of art, music
performances, sporting events, movie tickets, or even books on philosophy.
Following Singer’s reasoning, we have to ‘save every life that we could.’ In fact,
when we compare the situation of global poverty to anything that is above our basic
need in everyday life, it is difficult to conclude that there is anything which is more
important than to save one more life if we are able to do so. If we act according to
what Singer says, it would be the conclusion that we have to donate everything
unnecessary to poverty relief organizations, not only once, but continuously month
by month. It seems hard accept this conclusion even when we initially think it is
alright to lend our hand to the drowning child. But why would there be such a
marked difference? It can only conclude that it is because the analogy is not
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appropriate.
Even if the analogy of Singer holds, what would be the situation? What would
be the scenario if world poverty is analogous to drowning child?
Poverty is continuously happening everywhere in the world, and is mainly in
Africa. It is not really the same as the case of sinking child as first proposed by
Singer. It amounts to a failed analogy. Singer improperly thinks that the ubiquitous
situation of world poverty is genuinely analogous to the emergency of the sinking
child. That suggests, that world poverty seen in terms of drowning child, there is a
huge number of drowning children in ponds everywhere around the world, in every
single minute of time. There are so many people suffering in poverty. They are in
desperate need. There are in fact vast numbers of people that need to be saved.
There are children far away from us dying everyday from the causes of absolute
poverty. But, according to Singer, distance does not matter. So, if the analogy is right,
we can say that there are children drowning everyday in front of us when we are
walking on the way to work42. According to Singer, we have to save them. We need
to give our helping hands to them. We must pull them out from the pond.
We save one at the beginning. It means making our clothes wet and probably
late for work. But these are not important when we compare these with the life of the
sinking child. Therefore, we do not hesitate and save him from drowning. We
42
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successfully pull him out and, maybe, check whether he is hurt or not. After
confirming that he is alright, and then we would continue to be hurry on for work.
However, when want to move on, we see there is another child who is sinking in
another pool which is not far away. Once again, we consider whether we choose to
hurry on for work and keep our clothes from getting wetter or to save the child.
When ought to save the child, considering what Singer urges us to do. But when we
see clearly, there is not only a single child. In a little bit further pool, the situation is
alike. We see another little kid who is also sinking. When we look further, there are
quite a lot of sinking children in different pools on the way to our working place.
What should we do next? We may face this question every time when we save a
single child. We have to choose every time between to save one more or to let them
die. Nevertheless, the only way to choose is to track Singer’s contention and to save
the kid every time when we see they are drowning. It means after saving one from
desperate needs, we have to think of saving another one, and so on. What would be
the end? The end would come when we see no one is drowning or, more precisely, no
one is living in impoverishment. The end of our duty would mean the end of absolute
poverty. We have to continuously give away our money if there is at least one who
lives under indigence.
It is hard to accept we have this kind of duty to save each and every life. But it
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is the true picture of poverty that happening in our daily life. There are myriad
numbers of people living on the edge of life and death. Everyday, there would be
quite a large amount of them dead. We know that, although we do not see it,
countless people are poverty-stricken on the other side of the world. When we are
thinking about purchasing a new car, we are definitely wicked. We should donate the
money to transnational charity organizations working on poverty alleviation. But we
should not feel that we are doing well to sacrifice the chance to get a new car. We
should then give away the money which we are planning to spend on new stylish
clothes, just because there are still lots of suffering people. The truth is that poverty
would not end after we save one or two or few of the poor. It is continuously
happening. It is ubiquitous. We ought to donate every cent which is not spending on
necessities. It is because poverty will not end easily by simply giving away the little
amount of money from a personal effort. Even if we do give our share of money, the
poverty still does not end. The question would come to mind repeatedly and ask
ourselves whether we should once again give away our money, or spend for our own
happiness. This question recurs time after time simply because the poverty is
ongoing. What should we do? Giving away our surplus without a limit? We want to
help, but we do not prepare to contribute that massively. It is hard to accept this
consequence. But In Singer’s words, we have to save “as much as we can”. If we
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have to give away all the money otherwise spent on for luxuries, then we can only
live on basic necessities. It is very likely to be an endless duty. We do accept Singer’s
principle at the beginning, but we cannot accept the conclusion of unlimited supports
required from us. What is wrong? It is because Singer fails to identify the differences
between ongoing evils and emergencies. He is wrong to think that they are strictly
analogous to each other.
Let us give concession to hold that Singer is correct and that the analogy is
appropriate. That means we see drowning people everywhere as the people living
under ubiquitous global poverty. Does it mean we must save them all? What would
be the case in the real world? Badhwar mentions in her article an example in India.
She says those better-off who are living side by side with the extremely poor are
simply unconcerned. She says that in India, there are relatively rich people who live
with indifference as close neighbours to a large number of desperately poor people.
Their attitudes tend to completely ignore those destitute people that they pass by
everyday. And those needy would not think those well-off are doing something
wrong in passing by dismissively and giving no assistance to their desperate need43.
This is a very terrible scenario, indeed. It is also terrible to deny that we are
obliged to help. But what can we do? “We have our own lives to lead.”44 We can
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save some of them but not all. We cannot and we would not save everyone if there
are multitudinous sufferers. If we follow what Singer says, we can hardly pursue
anything that is worth pursuing for my own self. It even seems hard to make my own
living because I have to pass by a large number of drowning children when I go to
work.
If there are drowning children in ponds all the time when you are on the way to
your office, and if there are ponds with drowning children everywhere, would you
always save them as it only results in your clothes constantly being ruined? I think no
one would say, ‘yes, I will always give them help!’ I think no one, or very few people,
would accept Singer’s argument together with its full consequences.

3.5.2 The Failure of the Analogy
I admit this criticism is a powerful and serious challenge to Singer’s argument if
his argument heavily relies on the analogy. It can nearly make his argument collapse.
Singer’s argument starts from a very simple assumption that a drastic deprivation of
some basic human needs is a bad state of affairs. Then he infers from this assumption
the principle that we ought to prevent a bad thing happening if doing so would not
cause us any comparable disadvantage. In order to have a better understanding of the
application of the principle, he gives the case of drowning child. It applies to the case
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when we see a small kid playing in the shallow pond who is about to drown. In this
situation we must pull him out even if it may ruin our beautiful shoes and suit. It is
easy to agree about this. And now he gives us another, allegedly analogical scenario:
there are many people around the world who are actually in the same situation as the
drowning child (their lives in danger), and we can easily save them. Singer tells us
there is not much difference between the two cases. If you agree to deliver your
assistance in the first case, there is no reason to reject giving your effort in the
second.
But this is not an essential component of Singer’s argument. His principle does
not necessarily have to rely on the analogy. His principle can be applied to both cases
independently. Neither one of two cases has to rely on the other. The principle
applies to the first, and also applies to the second. This criticism can diminish the
importance of the analogy. Or perhaps, I should say, this criticism successfully
stresses the difference between the two cases, the difference in directness of saving a
life and the difference between an emergency and ongoing evil. However, this
approach rejects Singer’s argument only if his principle has to apply to the case of
world poverty via the case of saving a drowning child. It means if his principle’s
applicability to the second case relies only on the applicability of the first case, his
argument can be refuted by pointing to the failure of the analogy. However, in his

- 48 -

latest book The Life You can Save, Singer himself does not treat the drowning child
case as an essential part of his basic argument. He regards it as one of many
applications of the principle.45 It can be applied to the first case, the second case, or
any other similar case, separately and independently. He points out the purpose of the
analogy:

“To this I would respond that the drowning child analogy is best
seen as an ad hominem, and not as a way of grounding the argument for a
demanding view of our obligation to the poor. The point of the analogy is
to force people to recognize an inconsistency in their moral
convictions.”46

Singer’s uses the analogy for his argument because people may psychologically
agree to help in the first case, but they may think they have no duty in the second
case. They have no obligation to help these extremely poor. But Singer tries to
convince people they are equally wrong if they fail to save the life of a child in the
shallow pond as if they fail to send money to save a Bengali kid from dying from
poverty related causes. According to him, there is no relevant moral difference
between the two situations.
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This is a carefully constructed argument. As I have said in the Chapter one, the
argument depends on no particular traditional ethical theory. It is supposed to apply
to everyone. Each person, therefore, should think before they spend money on
luxuries.
Some philosophers think that there is a fatal fallacy in Singer’s analogy. He
ignores a crucial difference between ongoing evils and emergency. At first glance,
this criticism seems quite convincing. However, after careful examination, I would
say that it is based on a misreading of Singer’s argument. His principle can still
apply to the situation of global poverty without relying on the analogy, although it
can no longer force people to recognize an inconsistency in their moral beliefs.
Therefore, we can conclude that although it is OK to criticize Singer’s analogy
he does not fail to make a strong case for a moral obligation to help the poor. His
argument still stands. The criticism of the analogy cannot successfully overthrow
his whole argument but only the part that does heavily rely on the analogy. However,
I will show that there is another criticism that is a much stronger objection to
Singer’s argument.

3.6.1 Real Life Case in India
Badhwar thinks that even if the analogy is correct and appropriate, the case of
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poverty is similar to that of a drowning child, we would not give help, at least not
much. Badhwar gives an interesting example in her article. She mentions that there
are a certain number of rich people in India. There are at the same time so many
people who are living in severe poverty. Their living conditions are poor, some even
lack shelters. They do not have enough food; they do not have clean water. They
suffer a lot, and they suffer badly. However, even though this is the case, those rich
or better-off people who live nearby them often do not give any help at all. They pass
through and pass over the distress of the paupers. They are nearer than us to the poor
and the suffering. They may have given them immediate assistance which could
possibly be more efficient that help from afar. But they see the chronic
impoverishment as a part of everyday lives. These are ongoing evils happening day
by day, minute by minute. They do not help, just like our intuitions of drowning
children in the ponds everywhere around us which would appear in every single
minute of time. And those needy people would not think those well-off are doing
something wrong or bad that passing by without regard and lending no hand for their
hardships.47 Everyone facing such ubiquitous recurring-emergencies would do little
actually, even if they are suffering just inches away in front of us. It is a terrible
conclusion, but “we have our own lives to lead.”48 It is simply the fact that we can
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not save them all.

3.6.2 Evaluation on the Case in India
Badhwar shows this case as an illustration because she thinks that even if we
agree we are indeed obliged to save the drowning kid and nearly moved to give away
money not spent on necessities, we still would alter our actual attitudes and give no
help if there are large numbers of people with urgencies similar to the drowning child.
Badhwar’s point is that even if the analogy is true and appropriate, we still would not
give help. Imagine that we are living in India, or any place like India where hunger is
happening day by day, and starvation is surrounding us, we could hardly do anything
to help significantly. It could be exceedingly altruistic only in theory, only on paper,
but not in the real world where the evils become part of our everyday lives. Badhwar
hence brings out the situation in India that practically no one gives their help to the
poor while passing through the street. And no one would blame those wealthy but
unmoved souls for doing nothing.
But I would wonder if the situation in India is happening in the United States of
America, will the Americans also be apathetic or not? I would say no, they will help
indeed.
People may think that giving out their money to strangers is different to saving a
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child in front of us because of the dissimilitude in distance. Let alone some reported
instances that some give away all his bequests for charity for strangers and leave
none for their descendants, and some donate their kidneys to another sicker person
who they have never known rather than donate it to his less-sick relative. These cases
show that living extraordinarily altruistic lives is not impossible. But people may
think these are particular and exceptional cases, and that one cannot conclude that
everyone would do the same. Let me give some more examples.
Just recall for a moment the sad memory of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, which
passed across southeastern part of the US. Many places were affected by the
destructive power accompanied with Hurricane Katrina especially those living in the
city of New Orleans. The Americans were not stony in the face of this catastrophe.
On the contrary, the populace donated US$6.5 billion for disaster relief. Together
with the Federal government, NGOs (non-governmental organizations) international
assistance, the US was able to confront this hardship.49
And remember further the astounding earthquake that happened in Sichuan
Province, China on 12 May, 2008. The deadly earthquake measured as 8.0 Ms50
caused nearly 70,000 confirmed dead, 400,000 injured, about 4.8 million homeless,
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and more than 10 millions suffering51. People donated generously in response to this
disastrous catastrophe. Those people gave away their money including the more
affluent citizens in Hong Kong, entrepreneurs in mainland China, as well as people
in other Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, and other people from all over
the world including Europe and the Americas. Even the relatively poor Chinese
people also give away their money. They are not rich, and many of these people just
live slightly above the threshold of their basic needs. Yet some of them even gave
away the money which was going to be used on their basic necessities. It is because
they think those sufferers are in compelling need. They were willing to contribute
something even it meant they and their families had had to face a certain period of
economic hardship. This means risk to some of them yet, they give. And donations
came from all walks of life. Some of them are still giving today for the
reconstruction works.
One more example is the 2004 South Asia Tsunami caused by an undersea
earthquake in Indian Ocean. It affected 11 countries in South Asia, caused 225,000
deaths, and made countless numbers of people injured and homeless.52 South Asia is
normally combined with poor countries. The Boxing Day Tsunami required quick
humanitarian assistance. Billions of dollars in aid came in from communities around
51
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the world, let alone the governmental assistance which was made available. That
assistance was given by people who had never been to South Asia. Some people left
their countries and came to help out as volunteers. Some of them even left their
well-paid jobs to provide assistance. It was Christmas time, when many people from
different parts of the world (as well as many local people) were enjoying their
holidays. At the moment when the Tsunami came, people fled for their own lives.
But it is reported some of them tried to rescue people nearby. They saw people suffer
in front of them and they instinctively caught people in a great danger and could not
easily let go their hold. Though they might not have been aware of whom they were
saving, and although they might be at risk, they did it without hesitation. Some of
them even regretted not saving more or for failing to catch someone’s hand
afterwards. They mentioned that losing them to the waves seemed to them just like
killing them, even though nobody would blame them.
These cases show the altruistic response to giant disasters. These also show our
altruistic action would not be limited to people that we know. If the calamity
happened in front of us, we would likely do our best to save lives. If it were a
distance away, we would still donate money for humanitarian relief works. We are
not deaf to pleadings for help. Long after the disasters happened, there are still
volunteers working for the reconstructive work like building houses, schools, and the
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psychological and physical surgeries and remedies.
Badhwar thinks notwithstanding the postulated appropriateness of the analogy
between global poor and sinking child, we would not offer help. However, I will
argue, if the analogy is correct, we would in fact give help and give without
hesitation. If the analogy is correct, people should realize that global poverty is the
deadliest worldwide catastrophe of our day. Every case of famine or sickness related
to poverty is the equivalent to an emergency as in the case of the drowning child.
However if the emergencies caused lot of death just like or more than tsunamis,
earthquakes, hurricanes, I do not see why we choose to help the relatively small scale
one rather than the immense misfortune like global poverty. People are willing to
help in the big scale disasters like 2004 South Asia Tsunami, so then why not a much
bigger one? The inaction of the affluent world today is due to the fact that they do
not realize it is something even more disastrous than all of these other tragedies.
However if the analogy is true, and people know that poverty is the most astonishing
calamity happening in the world, they would not refuse to help. If they knew that dire
poverty is just like the emergency of earthquakes or tsunamis, they would not refuse
those who they can easily save in front of them.
Another point I want to make here is that the mere fact of ‘we cannot save all’
does not necessarily imply that ‘we should save none.’ We cannot save all, but we

- 56 -

can still save some. And we have to save some if there is such an emergency in
extreme poverty while the sufferers can die so easily with the lack of our help. ‘We
cannot save everyone’ is an insufficient excuse for inactivity. Actually, at the end of
this paper, I will argue that pulling everyone out of absolute poverty is not
impossible.

3.7.1 Disastrous Effects of Aid
Following Singer’s advice that the affluent people stop buying luxuries would
lead to several disastrous effects. Firstly, many factories manufacturing luxury
commodities are placed in developing countries. Most of these goods are produced
by people living in poor countries. They earn their own living by working in the
factories. The dominant factories there are set up by foreign investors. However, if
we stop buying those goods, the factories and its collaborative plants would collapse.
Quite a large number of people there would become unemployed. People who are not
regarded as poor may fall into the poverty trap. Those under the threshold of poverty
could even suffer more than before. This would clearly defeat our main purpose of
teaching these people to earn their own living.
This will also happen in rich countries. In affluent countries, there are many
shops selling commodities and services we do not actually need for maintaining our
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ordinary lives, for example the café and tourist agencies. If we stop buying luxury
goods and services, those shops selling these products would very likely collapse.
People in affluent countries working in these shops and related industries would
become unemployed. Then even some rich people would lose their jobs. Things
would go from bad to worse. The whole western consumer economy would be
destroyed, as well as the entire world economy, as a chain effect. These are
foreseeable consequences if we stop buying luxuries. Although they are called
luxuries, their production has a much wider impact on the world economy than just
satisfying needs that may seem superficial and useless.
If we are not allowed to buy luxury products, this would encourage affluent
people to abandon some of their jobs. This is because on that view we could not
freely choose our own interests and ways to live our own lives. We would be allowed
just to get the basic necessities and nothing more. However, the people in affluent
countries would then also provide for the basic needs of the worst-off. If someone is
on the border of poverty, it is likely that other people would help him. So, why
should he then work for his own living at all? Everyone could only have the basic
necessities. There is no reason to work if everyone is at the same level in the end,
either being poor at the very beginning or reducing himself to poverty later. It is a
disastrous effect. If this happens, the economy collapses, both in affluent and
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developing countries.

3.7.2 Evaluation on the Disastrous Effects of Aid
This is a forceful criticism of aid. It is especially focused on the extreme
demandingness of the principle defended both by Singer and Peter Unger (whose
argument I will discuss in the next section). The criticism implies that if we continue
to give away money except what we need for mere subsistence, it could destroy the
world economy. Because it would make many people lose their jobs and suffer from
it. It is very forceful, especially when pointing to Singer’s argument. But Singer
himself also indicates that if aid has harmful effects, we should not give. However,
the argument from Cullity can avoid this problem, as I will argue in the next section.
But practically, I would say that the affluent people nowadays are still far away
from this disastrous effect. It is because there is a big gap between what they give
and what they are required to give by Singer’s demanding principle. They have never
remotely approached that level of aid. As I stated before, there is a perception that
Americans think that they are doing well on charity. They think their government, as
well as themselves as individuals, is giving a lot of money on aid. They think that the
US government should better use around 5% to 10% of the US Federal Budget on
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assistance works abroad.
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However, it turns out that they are far from what they

think they should give. The US government only spends 0.18% of their huge Federal
Reserve on foreign aid. And the US citizen as an individual among the wealthy
populace, they give away only 0.25% of their income on average. It is near to the
least charitable nations in the international aid league.54 More importantly, it is far
away from what they think they should do. They believe that the government
expenditures on foreign aid should be reduced to 10%, while this expected
proportion requires actually an immense increment from the government. The United
Nation calls for 0.7% of the Gross National Income of each country. But there are
only very few countries that meet this relatively low level. It is a standard that is very
far from making their economies collapse. For ordinary people in the US, they do not
even give a quarter of a dollar on every US$100 they earn for assistance works
overseas. Singer urges countries to give 1% of their income. It seems trivial, and
people even think that they should give much more. But the results indicate that they
are not acting in accordance with their proclamations. If Badhwar thinks that Singer,
by giving away 20-25% of his income each month, is guilty of inconsistency, she
may find that the ordinary citizens in affluent countries are also inconsistent as they
think they should give even more.
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However, indicating that the US population, as well as all the affluent people, is
not giving much and is still far from what Singer urges us to do cannot refute the
criticism that we are discussing. If we strictly follow what Singer’s principle urges us
to do, the scenario presented by Badhwar is very likely to happen. Although the
failure of the analogy cannot totally refute his position, it is the demandingness that
makes Singer’s principle fail. Therefore, we should make some changes in Singer’s
principle. Or we can search for another argument which can avoid the problems that
Singer faces.
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Chapter 4
Other Arguments on Aid

After examining and evaluating Singer’s argument and criticisms of it, we see
there are some difficulties it has to face. It is a pretty controversial position to ask for
one’s surplus wealth. It is confronted with diverse objections, just as the analogy was.
Especially, the most fatal criticism is directed at the foreseeable disastrous
consequences following from the principle. Singer’s argument is carefully
constructed and clearly articulated. Singer tries to persuade people that the current
impoverishment around the world is the same as the situation of the drowning child.
If we accept the principle, we should have the same intuition in both cases. We
should then have the same obligation to save the poor as well as the kid in the pond
before us. The principle introduced by Singer is not necessarily connected with the
analogy, but it does become weaker without the moral intuition of the case of the
drowning child. His argument would not be wholly overthrown because of the failure
of the life-saving analogy. However, it would turn out to be much weaker than before.
Singer’s Principle can still be applied to the case of global impoverishment and he
can still call for our donation on these grounds. The argument may be as follows.
There are many people around the world desperately suffering form poverty.
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They live without enough food, clean water, elementary dwelling, basic sanitation
facilities, essential medical care etc. They can die easily. It is horrible. But we can do
something. We can save them by giving away our surplus money that is not spent on
basic necessities for us and our families. By doing this we can save their lives, while
it does not cause us any comparable disadvantage. We do not know these poor people,
but this should not make any difference or impose a moral boundary between them
and us. Therefore, we ought to help them.
Without the analogy, the argument still works. But it is less persuasive than
before. People may not be affected by the desperateness that those poor people may
face, without the drama of the drowning child in front of us. People in affluent
countries might not realize how urgent the circumstances are. They may not
recognize their inconsistency in the two cases without an appropriate analogy. The
drowning child case is a more easily understandable scenario. We do have a strong
urge to save the drowning innocent kid. But without connecting it to the case of the
drowning child, the case for helping the poor does not have such a strong intuitive
strength.
Another criticism which I consider fatal is the excessive requirement put on the
affluent people. Despite the gap between what people are giving and what they are
required to give is still very big, it logically leads the affluent counties to dire poverty
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if we strictly follow Singer’s advocacy. If one gives out all her surplus, she is very
likely reducing himself to the edge of poverty. The demandingness is so harsh that
we are not allowed to keep “surplus” money or to buy luxuries. But it would
probably destroy the current economies because everything about the luxury
products as well as the entire world economies would collapse. It could cause more
people end up in the poverty trap. It is the result of living according to Singer’s
standard. It frightens many people and makes them unwilling to live up to this level.
Therefore, in accordance with these two crucial objections to Singer’s argument, I
will search for additional argument from other philosophers that try to follow his line.
Some of them are based on Singer’s position, and some just separately make another
argument. I will generally and briefly describe some of these arguments rather than
go into detail because not all of them are successful in strengthening Singer’s stance.
I will only consult Cullity’s argument at length as I think that his perspective is
useful and can successfully avoid the criticisms that Singer faces.

4.1 Similar arguments from Peter Unger and Onora O’Neill
4.1.1 Unger’s Argument
Unger makes similar argument as Singer’s. Actually he makes his own
supposition in the light of Singer’s ‘inconclusive argument’ and his ‘importantly
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correct’ conclusion55. He admires Singer’s conclusion that we ought to give away our
surplus wealth for alleviating global poverty. However, he finds Singer’s argument is
not quite successful. He correctly points out that there is not only one child drowning
on the way to work. This effort of saving endless babies could well cause us to lose
our jobs. Then we are no longer able to give for the poverty relief activities.
It inspires him to advance his own argument. But his position is generally
regarded as being a more controversial one. In his article “living high and letting
die,” he argues that if we fail to meet the requirement to save the sufferers in dire
poverty but instead live a comfortable life, we are in effect, letting those people die.
He uses an Envelope argument. When we receive the envelope from UNICEF, and if
we toss it into the trash without hesitation, we are doing something morally wrong.
We can easily save lives in distant places if we write a cheque and send it back to
UNICEF. They will use this amount for relieving global poverty, and it would
contribute to fewer people dying from unfulfilled desperate needs. Unger cries for
substantial assistance to those poor. He even thinks that we should try our best to
make as much money as we can, and send all of it after of course satisfying own
basic needs. According to his position, we should try to get even better-paid jobs. It
would be preferable to do something concerning the relief work, just like being a
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volunteer in UNICEF or conducting research for ways to solve the astonishing global
poverty. He may think that we are under a moral duty to make as much money as we
can, and to try to acquire as much wealth as possible. Otherwise, we are doing
something in the pursuit of our laziness in maximizing our fortunes. And of course,
the money we get in excess of meeting our necessities does not actually belong to us.
It belongs to the distant poor in desperate lands. Therefore the money should be spent
on the starving masses of the world.
Unger offers a similar conclusion to Singer in the sense that we are letting
destitute people die unless we contribute our surplus to international aid agencies.
We can easily save these people. We can do it by sending a cheque to UNICEF or
Oxfam. It is a view very much akin to Singer’s. Yet this is not the most controvertible
element. The most unacceptable part is that he thinks we ought to try our best to
create wealth if possible. We should attempt to find more well-paying occupations if
we have the ability to do so. But these are only the means. Gaining more money is a
means for doling them out. It is only a means at relieving people living in dire
poverty but not for our own sake. We should grasp every chance to get more money
because, if we are not doing so, it makes us deeply immoral. High-paying jobs are
not necessary to be pleasant for everyone. For example, the professors doing research
in universities could probably get a more rewarding remuneration if they would be
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working in private companies. But they enjoy something more than a merely
materialistic return. Even if we are giving away our entire surplus, but keeping the
less-paying but enjoyable jobs for us, we are, for Unger, still doing something wrong.
We cannot enjoy the fruit of selling our manpower if we follow Singer’s advocacy.
But now, we can even not enjoy the way we are devoting our labour force. We are
immoral if we fail to grip every opportunity for maximizing our assets. It is why
people find Unger’s advocacy hardly acceptable.
Moreover, his intuition on the Envelope ‘proves too much’.56 We are living well.
We find there is an envelope which is sent by UNICEF or Oxfam with leaflets inside
asking for our donation. He thinks if we toss the Envelope into the trash rather than
writing a cheque and sending it back to UNICEF, we are doing something morally
wrong. His argument proves too much because envelopes are not only sent by
UNICEF or Oxfam. There are many organizations doing different relief works may
also send you the envelopes as UNICEF does. ORBIS, Médecins Sans Frontières,
SPCA57, and many other organizations from different aspects may also send you the
Envelope. If we are obliged to respond to the Envelope, we have to respond to all
unless Unger shows the reason for the preference for UNICEF to any other NGOs.
Unger does not show the reason why we should only write a cheque to a particular
56
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organization. He does not recognize that if receiving the Envelope (and the need to
respond) is really the case, it proves too much for a reasonable person and leads us to
be morally required to reply to all such soliciting envelopes.

4.1.2 O’Neill’s Argument
O’Neill offers an argument parallel to the one of Singer’s. It is the lifeboat
argument. Just imagine that you and somebody else are adrift on a lifeboat. On your
boat, there is more than enough food and water which could suffice for the lives of
you and your fellows until you get to shore. You can even waste some of the food. At
this moment, you find some strangers on your boat. You do not know them. They
hide themselves in some places when you and your companions were not aware. The
problem now is that they are in extreme hunger. They simply need the food and water,
but they would not force you to contribute. They pose no harm to you. However, they
would die soon without any substances to allay their hunger. And even should you
choose to share your edibles with them, you are very likely to have enough for the
left of your journey. You can now decide whether you would give them food and
water or not.
O’Neill says if you are not contributing and they die because of starvation, you
are in effect killing them. You may think it is not my fault to bring them here, it is not
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my fault they do not have their own food or own lifeboats. No. O’Neill finds that you
are guilty because you keep your stores to yourselves. You let them die. It is the
moral equivalence of killing them.
It is the same of the extensive famines across nations. The world now is a
lifeboat earth. There are people suffering from dreadful hunger. They will die without
our aid. We living in wealthy nations have surplus food and water. We can actually
give the unnecessary stuff away in order to save some of those who are in the same
lifeboat — the Earth — with us.58 Even if we are not responsible for their bad
situation, (we have not taken their food from them) we are still obliged to help. We
have to give them our money to satisfy their basic needs. If we choose to withhold
our wealth, we are killing them. You can save their lives, and you get this chance.
But you do not do it.
O’Neill is even more radical than Unger. She blames those egoistic people for
keeping their surplus. She calls them killers. It is an unacceptable reproach because
we do nothing that leads to their death actively. But I am not trying to go into
distinguishing the moral differences between killing and letting die. It is still a
debatable ethical topic among philosophers. I would say O’Neill’s argument fails as
her analogy would face the same problem that Singer’s one is confronted (as
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Badhwar explained). If the analogy is appropriate, there would be not a few but
legions of strangers to be found in our lifeboat. We obviously cannot save all of them.
Thereafter, many of them will die. Forgetting that we would be called the killers, we
are once again facing the ubiquitous and countless strangers in the same lifeboat with
us. We have to think again whether we should help this one, and afterwards another
one. It is a tragedy without an end. What would people do if they are really in such a
lifeboat? According to Badhwar’s example in India, we would do nothing.

4.2 Liam Murphy, an Egalitarian View
Liam Murphy is an egalitarian. He proposes a point of view that is the same as
his moral position. It is an egalitarian perspective. He thinks that we should calculate
how much in the world is needed for alleviating worldwide poverty. We should
therefore equally divide the required sum over the global population. Everyone on
the planet would then share the same amount of this sum. Following that, every
single person should give away this required quantity of money for assistance to the
victims of worldwide poverty. After contributing this equal shared amount, one can
stop giving. No one should be blamed if they have already met this minimal level.59.

59

(Murphy, 2000).
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Evaluation
However, what if there is somebody who has given less than their required level
or they do not give at all? Murphy believes there are no reasons for one to give more
merely because the others fail to do their part. One’s own obligation is his equal
share, no less, no more. It is typically an egalitarian point of view. But it is
nonetheless a fact that a certain number of people do not give what is required from
them. But this mere fact, for Murphy, makes no increment on our parts of shared
duties. We can just give the same amount assigned at the very beginning. It cannot
relieve the ongoing extreme poverty if some of the affluent people refuse to give. It is
because the money needed is calculated on the assumption that every person pays his
share. No excess donation would be asked for. I would wonder if Murphy’s approach
is really designed to solve the problem of desperate global poverty or not.
Let us have a thought experiment here. Imagine a portion of the world
population answer Murphy’s call, let say, very optimistically and very fortunately,
50% of the world populace. It is obviously not enough for saving all the poor. Some
of them, lets us say 50%, still have to encounter the desperate hunger, lack of safe
drinking water, illiteracy, absence of basic health care, unavailability of electricity,
infrastructure etc.. No one would save them. It is because aid is stopped after some
give their equal share and some refuse to do their part. These 50% of the poor
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population are unfortunate and hopeless. It is horrible, but we just give what is
required. Please blame those who give nothing. We feel well after fulfilling the
requirement. Let me present another scenario. Imagine there are 200 drowning
children around the area you are living in. After a scientific and accurate calculation,
everyone in that area should save 2 children. But 50% of the populace in this area
just wants to be free riders by giving no help. Therefore, there are 100 children left to
die in the ponds. When you pass in the street and see some children sinking, would
you feel it is alright to leave them alone and go your way simply because you had
already saved 2 before? Could you escape from serious condemnation about your
apathetic inactivity simply because you have done your own part? I think in both
scenarios, not necessarily related or analogous to each other, we would agree that the
problem we wanted to solve had not yet been worked out. Murphy seems to say that
we could feel contented for fulfilling the requirement. It initially seems to be a
pleasant approach, because the failure of others would not burden us to give more.
However, after going into detail, it seems that this is even more unsatisfactory than a
demanding proposal. Our moral intuitions in both cases are different from the way
Murphy urges us to react. We believe those left out are also worth saving. Murphy’s
stand is counter-intuitive. It seems Murphy’s position is only for making the affluent
feel comfortable with their limited donations, but not for relieving people from
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extreme poverty.
Another concern is the equality itself. Singer’s proposal depends on one’s
semantic understanding of basic necessities. Equal share approach divides the
amount that is essential for poverty relief to individuals, regardless of their wealth
and income. Although they are living in affluent countries like the US or Britain, the
difference of their wealth fluctuates. Murphy thinks that we should not ask for more
from the rich. The super rich would be giving the same amount as the household just
living a little bit above the basic needs. But this amount of money means different
things to them. It is another reason why many people find this approach
unacceptable.

4.3 Thomas Pogge, an Approach on Human Rights
Pogge works with matters of global justice and the connection between world
poverty and human rights. He is expert in John Rawls and Immanuel Kant. He has
many publications dealing with the duties and rights associated with global economic
order and world poverty. I will briefly expound his core argument that is presented in
his many books and articles.

“…I claim, then the better-off – we – are harming the worse-off
insofar as we are upholding a shared institutional order that is unjust by
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foreseeably and avoidably (re)producing radical inequality.”60

Pogge argues that we – the affluent populace – have to help the people living in
dire poverty. He thinks that everyone has positive duties to help others and, at the
same time, negative duties not to harm others. Negative duties are something that we
ought not to do, and Pogge focuses a good deal on this aspect. Someone who inflicts
harm on others should give full compensation to the victim. Nowadays the global
institutional and economic order is designed and upheld by the better-off. This global
institutional order is actually harming the least well-off around the world. It leads to
extensive and miserable inequality and poverty across nations. Its dreadful
consequences are foreseeable. And Pogge thinks that there are feasible alternatives to
this existing global order, but we do not do it that way. We are participants in this
unjust global institutional order and are benefiting from it. Therefore we are
responsible for the lot of the extreme poor. But we do nothing to compensate those
sufferers in the current global institutional and economic order. We, the affluent
peoples, are all human rights violators and are not offering due compensation.
On the other hand he thinks that all human beings have positive rights with
regard to basic necessities. He goes on to argue that under the current global
economic order, we the affluent people are actually imposing harm to someone living
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in dire poverty. Moreover, the affluent people are also depriving the least well-off
from their positive rights on the basic necessities. We violate the social-economic
rights of the least well-off. He means the current global economic order is violating
human rights. Therefore we should give away our money and assist the poor as our
compensation for causing harm to them.

Evaluation
Pogge is trying to argue, on a global scale, that all of us (affluent people of the
world) are responsible for harming the poor. We are violating our negative duty
which is “not to harm the other”, others who are the least well-off in the world. We
are harming the poor by depriving them of their positive rights to acquire the basic
necessities. In order to atone for hurting these disadvantaged human beings, we
ought to give away our money. Therefore we are violating our negative duties and
others’ positive rights.
I will divide his position into two parts and deal with each separately. At first,
we should ask whether we have a negative duty not to harm or not. And even if we
do have this kind of duty, how much is my own contribution to these harms.
Secondly, we should ask as to whether the poor, really possess the positive rights on
basic necessities. And even if they do have this kind of right, how can their positive
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rights dictate the actions of others?
A negative duty not to harm implies that we ought not to impose any
impairment on others. However, it could be presented in a positive form that is to
“prevent harm on others”. A positive duty requires an agent to do something, while a
negative one requires an agent avoid doing something. This kind of duty to prevent
harm is always presented in the positing of a positive duty. But it is not a problem to
understand something which is not in the traditional way, and this is what
philosophers always do. So, let’s accept the positive duty as well as the negative one.
It means we have the duty not to harm the others. But the next question is whether
we are harming the least well-off people or not. Pogge thinks it is obviously the fact
that the affluent countries shape the international institutional and economic order
and impose this order on the least well-off people. The least well-off are at the same
time those with the least voice. They have much less influence in the international
policy-making processes than do the rich. However, the rich are only concerned
about the attaining the benefits for their own countries. Therefore the current global
institutional arrangements are unjust and unequal. It leads to the large scale global
poverty. And we are participating in it and benefiting from the system. Then, we are
doing something unfavourable to the poor. We are violating our negative duty not to
harm.
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But I wonder how large is to be considered one’s contribution as an individual
in an affluent country? Nowadays, every aspect of our lives is somehow interrelated,
every country or society has some discrete relationship to others. At the same time,
the causes of poverty are also very complicated. For Pogge, the current institutional
order seems to be the overwhelming reason for the prevalence of world poverty. It is
hard to give an account for such a causal explanation. It is hard to substantiate the
claim that the current economic and institutional order is sufficiently, if not solely for
Pogge, contributing to the widespread impoverishments that we see in the world. It is
extremely hard, or impossible, to show Pogge’s causal explanation in the case of
global poverty.
But let’s assume that Pogge is right that the affluent population is in fact largely
responsible for the harming of the global poor through its involvement in the
international economic order. But for this, I think one’s own contribution to harming
the global poor at the global level is very small, if any. As a single citizen in a rich
country among hundreds of millions of people in a similar position, our effort in
contributing to the global order is at most trivial. Even if we agree that the current
world order is not just and equal, we have to struggle to be in a position to actually
change things. What I am saying is that we are not responsible for the tragedy. I
mean if we are responsible, we are responsible for a very little part of it. If this
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responsibility implies our compensation towards the world poor, the compensation
would also be very trivial. If Pogge is right that we are harming the least well-off in
the world, the most responsible unit is the governments of affluent countries. His
theory can enforce large scale assistance from the governments of rich countries.
When the responsibility and requirement for compensation breaks down into
individual level, it would be much less stringent. Pogge may argue that the affluent
countries are always established with democracies. For an individual, one can
dismiss the government with unjust international policies. But again, I will argue, it
imposes very few responsibilities at the individual level. I am not saying that wealthy
inhabitants of rich countries do not have to give. However, I think Pogge cannot
show that the role of an individual in the international institutional order is so
important that an excessive demand of their help could be justified. Therefore, I think
Pogge fails to mobilize us to give much, because of the trivial role we are playing as
an individual.
Moreover, Pogge claims that every human being has a positive right to basic
necessities. Having positive rights on something implies everyone has the rights to
acquire something. Anyone who obstructs others to acquire these things is violating
the others’ human rights. It means the rich who hinder the poor’s access to the natural
resources and basic necessities are violating their rights. Pogge thinks that the rich
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infringe upon the poor’s human rights through their domination in international
policies. The developing countries can only accept what the wealthy countries
imposed on them, like high and unacceptable tariffs, quotas for importing goods and
services from the developing world. But the prior question about this issue is whether
everyone, especially the least well-off, possesses this kind of positive right whether
they are basic necessities or not. It is always hard to prove human rights in positive
terms.
Pogge believes that it should be obvious that human beings have rights to
acquire the essential requisites of life. “The fundamental importance of basic
necessities for any human life supports the claim that there are such human
rights.”61 It simply says, the stuff to sustain our lives is so important, therefore we
should have rights on these things. It seems to be such a weak premise on which to
base an argument. But let’s us again assume the correctness of this positive human
rights on necessities.
If it is true that all human beings have to rights on these commodities for
sustaining their lives, then why does it follow that we have positive obligations to
give to others in order to fulfill others’ positive rights? Pogge thinks that the obvious
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human rights exist, so the affluent people should give away money for helping those
who are suffering in the global institutional order. It is not quite clear why others’
positive rights on something entail that we should be obliged to allow them to
acquire these things, namely the essential requisites of life as every human being
needs. Why do others’ rights impose positive actions on us? If they have such human
rights on something, they can get these things themselves. The reason presumably to
help those least well-off is because we are harming their human rights. The reason
why we are harming is not correct is because it is our duty not to harm others. The
reason why it is harmful to the poor is because of their possession of such positive
rights. It is likely to entail some kind of circularity. But it is not necessary to be a
circular argument. There can be correlated duties and rights. However, Pogge should
offer a more clear argument as to why there are certain kind of rights and duties. And
he should consolidate their grounds in order to prevent circularities. Moreover, if the
positive right on basic necessities legitimately requires positive action on the others,
there would not be anyone working for their own living. Imagine that everyone
possessed the same positive human rights on food, and that everyone should fulfill
others’ rights on food immediately when there is somebody suffering from hunger.
Then there is no reason to be afraid of starvation. It is because when anyone feels
hungry, there should be someone comes to him and gives him a free lunch. The rich
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ought to feed the poor or, put differently, the poor have to be fed the rich for free. If
Pogge is correct on the positive rights on necessities, all food should be free in the
end. Everyone could just wait for food. It is their human right. It is absurd to accept
this kind of human right.

4.4 The Failure of Beneficence
Cullity published a book The Moral Demands of Affluence. He gives a
comprehensive discussion of the ethical issues concerned with assisting the poor
people. It includes the formulation of his argument, criticisms, countercriticisms,
some meta-ethical problems, with the support of various empirical data. I will
consider his argument and argue that his argument can avoid the problems that
Singer’s argument faced.
Cullity begins with an argument indicating that we should help poor people. He
then makes a principle which is a very demanding one. However, he goes on to show
that this principle could be rejected from an impartial point of view. He narrows its
application to a more moderate conclusion. I will go through his argument in this part.
And I would say that he can avoid the criticisms raised against Singer. Singer’s
argument faces different criticisms, and some of them are so crucial that make his
argument nearly conclusively overthrown.
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The Failure of Singer’s Argument
Although I mentioned in the previous section that Singer’s argument is not
based on the analogy between drowning child and global poverty, it is the most
disputable part of his argument. The problems of his analogy are that he ignores the
difference in directness in the two cases and the difference between ongoing evils
and emergencies. I think that this is a forceful argument against his analogy. It can
defeat his analogy. But I do not think that Singer’s argument is completely destroyed.
However, it does make the argument less persuasive. Even if his argument still stands
to some extent, it has to face another problem. It is its excessive demandingness
which could lead to a disastrous outcome if we follow Singer’s advocacy strictly.
This would destroy the economies both in the backward and affluent countries. This
makes the circumstances worse.
Therefore, I will briefly show how Cullity’s argument is constructed and explain
that how his argument can evade the fatal criticisms of Singer’s argument (the failure
of analogy and the over-demandingness).

4.4.1 Argument from Beneficence
Cullity actually starts with Singer’s argument because of its simplicity. Its
simplicity has its advantages. It is precise and forceful. But as we see, the principle
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and the life-saving analogy proposed by Singer encounter lots of criticisms. Although
I have argued that some of them are not successful, there are still few of them
pointing to serious problems. Cullity also sees this. Therefore after borrowing the
concept from Singer’s argument and life-saving analogy, he firstly tackles various
criticisms.
Cullity thinks, like Singer, that we ought to save people’s lives who are in great
need if doing so costs us only negligible loss, no matter whether these people are in
front of us or far away.62 It is morally wrong not to save, even if we have done
nothing to causes their suffering. Cullity introduces here the main concept in his
argument, beneficence. We are wrong not to save because it is a “failure of
beneficence”.63 The word “beneficence” means, for Cullity, the “practical concerns
for other people’s interests”.64 It means we do not show appropriate concerns for the
others.65 It is in other people’s interests that their lives be saved.66 But why does it
imply that we have to help the others? It means we should have reasons for the moral
action to help the other people. It is because of the goodness of the effect of my
action for them.
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“And in calling it a practical concern, I mean that there is a
distinctive

class

of

considerations

that

a

beneficent

person

characteristically regards as good reasons for action. I shall call these
considerations ‘a beneficent person’s reasons for action’. The core of
beneficence is this: it involves helping other people, and doing so because
you regard the fact that it will be good for them as a good reason for
helping them.”67

But the next question should be what the reason for us is to be beneficent.
Cullity says that the word “beneficent” is not in its ordinary usage. Cullity treats it as
a quality or attribute that one should pursue. The lack of the attribute “beneficence”
should be criticized. Failure of beneficence means one has not given enough concern
to further other’s interests, which is blameworthy68.
The argument from beneficence does not depend on any analogy. It applies to
all situations. It may not have to face the same criticisms of Singer’s analogy.
However, Cullity also addresses these problems. He thinks that talking about
immediacy and directness in morality about the initiatives of helping other people is
overtly self-regarding69. It has to be shown that the immediacy or directness plays an
important and relevant role in the application of our morality. It is hard to see these
two things could either lessen the poor people’s worthiness to live or weaken the
67
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requirement for helping others. However, it may provide a more pressing reason for
helping others more instantly. But it does not undermine the requirements of
beneficence.
One could say that helping a drowning child is different from saving people
from dire poverty. There is not a particular individual I am going to save when I am
giving money to aid agencies. But Cullity also regards it as not fruitful. A beneficent
person has to help if there is someone I can assist by doing something that I can do
without any important costs to me. But it does not imply that there has to be any
particular individual that is going to be saved. The argument from beneficence does
not restrict itself to any specific person, and it is not necessary that there is a known
specific individual who is going to be saved.70
These are the criticisms directed at Singer’s analogy. Although I argue that these
objections cannot refute Singer’s principle, they do strike at the core of the analogy.
However, Cullity’s position does not base itself on any analogy. Cullity shows that
his theory is immune to these irrelevant criticisms. They are not successful to refute
our basic responsibility toward the poor people. Our obligation on this is still valid.
Cullity also answers some other criticisms. Some of them were addressed by me in
the last section. I would not go into details on this.
Although Cullity can escape from the objections based on the differences of
70
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directness and immediacy, there is another criticism he has to face which effectively
shows Singer’s principle could lead to a disastrous effect. It is the excessive
demandingness of his principle. Cullity has to confront the same problem at this
stage because he borrows the argument from Singer. His argument is the same that
would lead one to face the recurring appearance of a question that whether she
should give more or not. And according to the argument examined here, she ought to
give if the cost is so trivial to her. This may lead to the same consequence that she
has to reduce herself to the edge of poverty. Therefore, Cullity calls the requirement
of his argument at this stage “The Extreme Demand”.71 The Extreme Demand is
something like Singer’s principle. It requires us to give away my time and money to
the aid agencies working for poverty relief. Its requirement would not end, unless the
entire world poverty is wiped out, as long as we are not going to sacrifice something
more important than saving the next life. Cullity also sees its problem and tries to
reject this Extreme Demand in the second part of his book. Moreover, he also gives
another moderate demand.
The Extreme Demand as well as Singer’s principle is so demanding. They evade
many of the criticisms. Although Singer’s principle was rejected, it was only rejected
by its foreseeable and very possible consequences, but not by any failure in Singer’s
logical reasoning. They are so obviously pointing out our wrongness if we fail to
71
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fulfill the duties required. The Extreme Demand is derived from the argument from
beneficence. It calls for too much from us, but how to refute it?
Cullity thinks that it is hard for anyone to accept a proposal like the Extreme
Demand. But it is not yet a reason to reject the Extreme Demand simply indicating
that one has to sacrifice himself until the edge of poverty.72 Other than some basic
necessities, there is always something else that is significant and that we pursue and
cherish. These things make our lives worth living. Cullity calls this kind of goodness
the personal life-enhancing good. If one follows the Extreme Demand, his
life-enhancing goods may possibly be weakened, lessened, or impaired. The
life-enhancing goods include friendship, and personal projects, which are the major
goods mentioned by Cullity in his book.73
Despite the constitution by personal partiality, it is impartially acceptable to
have certain degree of partiality. That means it is agreed by everyone that there is
something worth cherishing personally. These things are not only worth pursuing.
Cullity think that they also give us reason to help the other to pursue these goods. It
is because they are “intrinsically life-enhancing good”.74 Previously, when talking
about saving lives in poverty, the reason to help is the interests from other people in
their own lives with a little cost to me while delivering my help. It is the requirement
72
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of beneficence to have practical concerns of other people’s interests. It means their
values in lives give us the reason to help.
Cullity then asks a further question about why people would have interest in
lives. The answers to this question can be varied. Some would say that it is for its
own sake that life is good, but not for any other reason. However for many people it
is not the answer for them. “What is more important, for most of us, is that our lives
are vehicles for the fulfillments that a well-lived life can contain.”75 This is the
answer for most people. Following strictly the Extreme Demand or Singer’s principle
would lead to “altruistically-focused lives”. It is a kind of lives that only focused on
helping the other. But we do want a “non-altruistically-focused lives”. This allows
us to have our own pursuits of personal goods.76 It is clearly not only the interests
constituting the life of me, but it is also other’s interests that to live
non-altruistically-focused lives that allowing them to have their personal pursuits.
This provides us the compelling reason to have them to pursue a well-lived life.
At the same time, it is also a reason to deny the Extreme Demand. It is because
the

Extreme

Demand,

like

Singer’s

principle,

denies

the

pursuit

of

non-altruistically-focused lives and denies the reason that life-enhancing goods give
for assisting other people having the same pursuits. Therefore it is acceptable to
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reject the Extreme Demand which is not compatible with the intrinsically worth
pursuing elements that constituting well-lived lives of people.77
But after rejecting the Extreme Demand, what would be the limit for giving?
When should we stop to help the others for pursuing their non-altruistically-focused
lives? And what kind of goods is permissible to pursue?
Cullity thinks that it is permissible for one to pursue certain kinds of goods that
are intrinsically life-enhancing, and these goods also ground the requirement on
others. It means it is requirement grounding goods on others. It requires our help
when people pursuing this kind of goods. But it is not required for us to help those
“purely episodic” goods, which do not lead to a better life in a long-run. It is not a
good reason for us to pursue this kind of goods rather than saving others’ lives.78 For
intrinsically life-enhancing goods, Cullity lists out seven categories in his book
including the close personal relationships, achievements on pursuing worthwhile
personal projects etc. He thinks seven categories is enough here.79 The conclusion of
the requirement and permissibility of beneficence is that one can spend if its
permissibility is entailed by this kind of life-enhancing goods, or until there is
requirement-grounding loss if there is further restriction on his spending. 80
Therefore, one can justly refuse to stop his spending on his own good only if there is
77
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deprivation on his non-altruistically-focused life, or it makes larger his
requirement-grounding loss, or it deprives him from a good better than the
requirement-grounding amount, or there is deprivation of his commitment good.
Other than these situations, he is bound by the argument from beneficence. He ought
to give away his money and time for other people’s interests and for their lives to be
saved. And it is a moral requirement which is hard or nearly impossible to refute.

Evaluation
Cullity gives a very careful and detailed argument, and with a very technical
reasoning process. He borrows the well known idea from Singer and develops his
own argument in the light of Singer’s weakness. He then makes the argument from
beneficence. He says we should help people satisfy their interests. He gives
persuasive objections to possible criticisms (some are evaluated in Chapter 3 and
some will be stated in Chapter 5). However, it still has to face its
over-demandingness like Singer’s one does.
Therefore, he makes an argument about the things that make our lives worth
living. Interests in these intrinsically life-enhancing goods gives us reason to help
others, also gives us reason to develop our own personal projects. I am required to
help the other unless my personal interests in these goods are harmed. The pursuit of
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these life-enhancing goods is not allowed on Singer’s principle and the Extreme
Demand. But here, this is a more moderate and reasonable argument than the
Extreme

Demand

and

Singer’s

principle.

It

avoids

the

problem

of

over-demandingness of our moral requirement. We are still required to help the poor
people. But at the same time, it allows us to pursue, and spend on, something that is
important and worthy to us. Moreover, it avoids facing the criticisms directed at the
dis-analogy of Singer’s argument. Therefore, I would say that Cullity’s argument
from beneficence is fruitful and we are required to help those poor people. Otherwise,
we fail in beneficence.
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Chapter 5
General Criticisms against Aid

The argument now is well formed. We can reason that we do have some
obligation to the global poor based on Singer’s argument. At the same time, by
introducing Cullity’s argument of beneficence, we can avoid the difficulties arising
from the failure of the analogy between saving drowning child and the obligation to
donate money for global poverty.
There are some further and general objections to aid. These objections are not
pointing to any particular argument of philosophers, but are pointing to the issue of
poverty relief generally.

5.1.1 Efficiency of Aid Agencies
The efficiency of the aid agencies is widely questioned. One may defend one’s
reluctance to give aid because one does not know whether one’s contribution would
really help those poor people. It is quite uncertain where the money goes. It is also
not clear that the amount reaching the destitute people is equal to the sum one
originally gave. One may suspect the money will probably be lost in the process of
delivery to the needy, or will never reach the poor. Therefore many relatively wealthy
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people in the developed countries do dispute giving their surplus to the poor.
Moreover, there are significant data that show the inadequacy of the
international aid agencies in their alleviation of global hunger, poverty and related
problems. Some of those aid agencies waste money and resources. Some of them do
not have knowledge and techniques required for using aid resources. It is not that
simple as Singer and other philosophers imagine.
There is also strong evidence that there is corruption within those organizations,
or among the governments and the bureaucracies in poor countries. The agents work
along with the temptation of misusing a vast amount of money. On the other hand,
the governments in those developing countries could enjoy free and huge inflow of
money and commodities because of the amount of aid. Development aid often is
depleted before reaching the hands of the impoverished.
Apart from corruption and waste of resources, it is still not that easy to help
sometimes. Just as with the seclusion of certain countries such as North Korea, the
despotic state allows none or very few aid agencies to enter their country and
monitor aid disbursements. Even though they permit some international agencies to
enter North Korea, the activities of the agents are severely restricted. The
international agencies, like the Red Cross, can do only very little in a self-secluded
country like this. Another example is the case of the destructive Cyclone Nargis on
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May 2008. Here the Burmese government refused the help from the foreign
governments and international NGOs several days after the disaster. They announced
that they only welcomed money. It is horrible that the Burma government isolated
themselves from the international relief effort on its own behalf. They rebuffed the
entry of international aid agencies and their planes which carried medicines, food,
clean water and many different kinds of necessities for fighting against the
unprecedented disaster in Burma. There were nearly 200,000 dead or missing.81 But
it is believed that many deaths could have been avoided if the Burmese government
would have responded immediately and have permitted the international relief efforts.
The governments in affected countries often hinder the efficiency of aid delivery, and
sometimes make the situation worse.
Sometimes it is not a political reason, but the geographical inaccessibility that
hinders the efficiency of aid. There may be certain rural places in the developing
countries that are unreachable. There is no viable infrastructure, such as passable
roads. There are places that cannot be approached by any transportation, or only by
some unusual transportation devices, such as boats or camels. There are some
undeveloped areas that could only be reached on foot. It is hard to carry large
quantities of aid materials to these remote locations. These circumstances would
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make aid activities ineffective. Therefore, one may refuse to help for these reasons.

5.1.2 Evaluation on the Efficiency of Aid Agencies
The ignorance of the efficiency of aid, the waste of resources, the corruption
and resistance of governments, the inaccessibility or certain rural places, these are all
factual objections to giving aid. But I think these factors cannot undermine the claim
that we are morally required to help severely impoverished people.
Firstly, I would agree that there is a lot of research showing the inadequacy of
the aid agencies which are working on poverty relief. But, on the other hand, there
are also many data showing the efficiency of the relief efforts. They come from
various sources. It is hard to compare these statistical reports. They are based on
different contexts, assumptions, subjects etc. I am not going to discuss these data in
detail here. It is the job of social scientists to debate about the correctness of data.
For those who say that they simply do not know if the money could really help
those poor people on the other side of the world, the argument is not certain. It is still
a question whether the relief work is useful or not. And they could even say they do
not know what other ways are effective to help the poor, therefore they should not be
blamed for not helping those worse-off. For these factual arguments for the rejection
of giving aid, Cullity gives some analysis. “Ignorance does not produce immunity
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from blame.”82 Cullity thinks that those people who appeal to the ignorance on
whether aid agencies are doing something efficacious or not are not successful in
their attempt to deny their moral obligation.
Moreover, for those people who firmly believe that aid is badly coordinated and
not efficient on delivering poverty relief, Cullity again argues that they cannot refute
their obligation with this reason.83 He argues that even if affluent people believe the
humanitarian aid is ineffectual, they fail to show that “the most helpful thing we can
do is nothing.”84 However, this cannot refute the argument that there is a moral duty
to help others. We are required to respond to others’ interests according to Cullity’s
argument presented in the last section. Believing that one of the ways to help is not
productive cannot wholly refute the moral requirement. Even if it turns out that aid is
not productive in various ways, the argument that we should be concerned about
others’ interests still holds true. Therefore, the argument on the efficiency of the aid
agencies cannot overthrow the obligation to help those least well-off people in the
world.

5.2.1 Fundamental Institutional Change is More Effective
Singer urges us to give all we’ve got other than necessities to aid agencies for
82
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the ubiquitous recurring-emergencies all over the world. However, it all entails one’s
excessive contribution if we follow Singer’s advocacy. We can hardly live our own
lives and follow our own interests. We would likely reduce our life to the edge of
poverty. Besides, if Singer’s argument is valid, since we are always required to save
those in dire poverty as well as the drowning child, the constant effort would simply
exhaust us. Some of us may also fall back to absolute poverty in the process of
rescuing others. Therefore, Badhwar thinks it is better to change the system that
allows people falling behind. Institutional change is the best way to end poverty, not
giving aid.
Badhwar says, “Our attitude may shift from a mixture of compassion, pity, guilt,
and despair to indifference and then to irritation at “those people” who can’t keep
their children from drowning,”85 She goes on, “more reflectively, we might feel
anger at the system that allows children to drown every day and attempt to fix it.”86
I think that she is right. We would not believe that we have to spend all our
surplus wealth on endless ‘emergencies’. We would not think that we have to spend
all our energy and money and save the least well-off from impoverishment during
our entire lives.
The most effective way to help, as Badhwar stated, is a fundamental change of
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the institutions in these poor countries. Institutional change is the best or may be the
only way for countries to escape from poverty, just like what happened in the Four
Asia Tigers, i.e. Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. Their successes
were not achieved by aid, but by their fundamental changes within their borders.
They have seen immense changes in their territories, like industrialization, adoption
of political democracy, legal changes, encouragement on international trades etc.
They are now among the most modernized places in Asia.
On the other hand, aid can never lead to economic attainment. Aid is not good
for an infant economy. Actually aid is not good for any economy. Aid does not have
any productive power in economists’ view. We may feel good by simply giving
money, but it is not helping these worse-off. They do not learn to live. They get
money and may get away from poverty. But after that, after they have consumed
those resources and money, and they fall back into the poverty trap again. It will
never end if we give them aid.
The only way to achieve a high-flying economy is to have the fundamental
changes. Countries in South Asia and Africa have long been lagging countries. They
are regressive on many aspects. They have to make fundamental changes in order to
flee from dire poverty. Reforms in politics, economics, legal, technological, social
and institutional aspects are needed. After improving outdated systems, there likely
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would not be any famine and impoverishment. People can benefit from the reforms.
They can get the job opportunities, make their own living, keep their assets safe, live
better, and enjoy their leisure times. In conclusion, we are better advised to help them
to run the reforms on their local institutions than to pour money into their countries.

5.2.2 Evaluation on the Fundamental Institutional Change
I would agree that fundamental institutional change is a very effective way to
relieve dreadful poverty. I agree it is efficacious, in the long run. But I think it cannot
be shown that emergency aid is not important or useless merely by revealing that the
most effective way for pulling people out from poverty trap is a fundamental change
in their local institutions. Poor people are living without enough food, safe drinking
water, medical care. These are essential requisites for maintaining their daily lives.
They can easily die. And actually there are many dying day by day. Their needs are
desperate and urgent. They cannot wait until there is a success of the local reforms.
Cullity has a similar view here. He thinks that we should ask two questions. One
is “what can we do to stop this (poverty) from happening again?”87 and “What we
can do to help these people now?”88 He believes pointing out that emergency aid
cannot solve the former does not lessen the significance aid can achieve for the latter
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question. It means we should distinguish an emergency help and the assistance in a
long run.
Even the fact that emergency aid is not sufficient for eradicating ongoing
poverty does not imply that there is nothing that aid can do. I agree that we should
have another kind of relief plan working in a long run. We do not want to see that
child drowns. And we do not wish to see those people that we rescued falling back
into the poverty trap. Therefore, long-term institutional reforms and changes in these
underdeveloped countries are necessary. However, the exigent aid is also essential for
life-saving purpose. These two kinds of assistance activities should be executed
simultaneously. Neither one can kick poverty away forever.

5.3.1 Encourage Dependency on Aids
Some people may think that aid is not a good way for relieving global poverty,
because it invites the victims in dire poverty to rely on aid only. We simply pour
money and materials into these developing countries. It makes the poor become
dependent upon those necessities provided by organizations on aid.
It can be presented in a kind of game theorist’s argument. If we save one
drowning child, people who observe it may throw again the child into the pond, and
see our response to it. And according to Singer, we are obliged to help continuously.
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After a long term experiments, they find that we are always here to help. It is the
same in world poverty. People that are suffering in severe poverty find we are always
here to help them. They may find that they do not need to make their own living and
we prepare everything for them. What they need to do is just say “welcome” to us. It
encourages their dependency on us. It is not healthy for either them or us.
Furthermore, they do not learn to make their own living. They just wait until we
help. They learn nothing from waiting and receiving aid money and resources. If they
do not earn their own living, and just simply await the aid agencies, even if it helps
them once, they are very likely to fall behind and fall back into absolute poverty.
Should we help them repeatedly? Yes, according to Singer. But it is an unwelcome
outcome. However, aid encourages them to do it this way. Aid encourages them to
wait for everything needed to maintain their lives. Aid encourages them not to work,
not to earn for what they need. They can sustain lives without doing anything. It is
never a good consequence for the people in rich countries, as well as the destitute
people. Therefore, we should not give anymore in order to avoid their dependency
and laziness.

5.3.2 Evaluation on the Dependency on Aids
I will say that it is not the whole story. The presupposition here is not correct. It
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is not the true that the poverty relief works are merely supplying money and
resources for them. And even if it is true that aid is generally leading to dependence,
it cannot refute our requirement for fulfilling other people’s interests.
On the position is that aid would result in economic dependency. Some argue
that aid could only encourage people’s dependencies on those in affluent countries.
They say that the recurrent inflow of money into poor countries misleads people in
those countries into thinking that basic things are always available and free. The poor
can just wait without doing anything. They do not have to have their own jobs. This
would only keep poverty going on and on.
But the presupposition is incorrect here. There are many kinds of aid activities.
It is not true that aid is only in form of inflow of money and materials. Actually,
many aid agencies are doing relief works without the pouring in of large amounts of
money. Some forms of aid are aiming at teaching the poor about self-sufficiency. It
aims at bringing about their ability to make their own living. Of course, for helping
dying people the only way it provide them with food and water, or remedies that they
need. It is an emergency help. But it is not the end for the relief work that is being
done today. Many organizations teach poor people, who are mostly agriculturists, to
farm with new form of technology, special skills, better growing seeds, pesticides,
herbicide and fertilizers, or teach them to make use of cattle and machinery. These
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kinds of organizations also teach women to read. It is because women always have
great influence in a family and they are responsible for nurturing their children. A
literate woman can teach their kids to read, prevent basic sickness, and participate in
certain economic activities. Some women and youngsters are taught to make various
handcrafts. So they can sell the products in the local markets, and make some money,
food or anything in return. Besides, through aid efforts, the poor are introduced to
knowledge of contraception. This is for the purpose of birth control. It is not going to
harm the rights of having babies. But they simply have too many that they cannot
bring up. And the problem of overpopulation in these underdeveloped places is very
serious. They have sex if they want it, without any means of contraception. They
give birth to many unwanted babies. But they do not have money or abilities to bring
the babies up. Many kids are abandoned. Some of them die easily because of a lack
of milk, food and water. Through aid efforts they can gain the knowledge to avoid
pregnancy, and then they can choose if they want a baby or not. Contraception does
help in another way as well. In these areas, wide-spreading HIV is a one of the
dominant fatal diseases. They enjoy sex without knowing the dangers of HIV. They
do nothing to prevent this killing disease. It could affect the following generations.
Therefore, having knowledge of contraception can save their lives and those of next
generations.
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These are all for the purpose of sustaining the lives of the poor people on their
own in a long run and for encouraging them to be independent of aid. It is because
emergency aid is not always here for any particular human being. They cannot just
wait for the uncertain assistance. And we also do not to see people like them would
only sit and wait for aid passively. They can do it by making their own harvests and
profits. They can escape the poverty trap in a long run. And it is the way the relief
efforts are most effective.

5.4.1 Aid Leads to Poverty by Dambisa Moyo
Economist Dambisa Moyo worked for Goldman Sachs for the last eight years
and possesses a PhD from Oxford University. She comes from a very poor African
country – Zambia. So, she does have the qualification to deal with this problem. But
she, as a Zambian, does not urge for more aid from the affluent countries. On the
contrary, in her very latest book Dead Aid, she argues that aid leads to poverty.
In her book Dead Aid, she gives a lot of concrete data in support of the claim
that aid has not actually helped poor countries during the past decades. She even goes
further by arguing that aid is actually harming the development of African countries.
There were a trillion US dollars flooded into Africa in the past 60 years. However the
per-capita income is even lower than it was in the 1970s. 50% of the total population,
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more than 350 million people, in Africa is living less than $1/day. This situation
tends to become progressively worse.
And the corruption in Africa is nothing secret. The bureaucracies overtly steal
huge amount of money from their countries. But the West turns a blind eye to it and
continues to pour aid into Africa. Large amounts of free resources and money inflow
encourage military struggles among African countries. If they seize power, they can
enjoy a lot of benefits. This leads to the political and social instability.
Aid industries also destroy the local economy. She gives an example as
explanation.

Even what may appear as a benign intervention on the surface can
have damning consequences. Say there is a mosquito-net maker in
small-town Africa. Say he employs 10 people who together manufacture
500 nets a week. Typically, these 10 employees support upward of 15
relatives each. A Western government-inspired program generously
supplies the affected region with 100,000 free mosquito nets. This
promptly puts the mosquito net manufacturer out of business, and now his
10 employees can no longer support their 150 dependents. In a couple of
years, most of the donated nets will be torn and useless, but now there is
no mosquito net maker to go to. They'll have to get more aid. And African
governments once again get to abdicate their responsibilities.89
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The case would be similar to other kind of aid, e.g. food aid. Millions dollars are
used to buy American-grown food, and then be shipped form the US to the other side
of the world. The flooding of American food makes the local farmers lose their jobs.
Aid discourages production, and destroys the local economy. People there may want
to make their own living, but they fail to compete with the flooding of foreign market
with free goods and products.
She blames the aid advocates who spend very little time to address the
usefulness of aid. Why would a country seek aid rather than other better forms of
financing? It is mysterious for the aid supporters.
She states that there has not been even one country that could achieve economic
success by simply relying on aid to the degree that many African countries do.
Economies that depend on aid almost universally fail, but those that do not rely on
aid succeed. She takes the examples of India and China. They achieved economic
success by the changes within their own boundaries, rather than by receiving aid
from outside.
She gives lots of data and evidence to support her argument. This claim seems
very radical. She does not simply say that aid does not help in poverty relief. She
even goes further by claiming that aid leads to poverty, and makes the poor people
poorer.
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5.4.2 Evaluation on the Poverty-leading Argument
I think Dambisa Moyo is right to a certain extent in her claim that aid leads to
poverty. But I would say it is to a limited extent that she is right. Her view is partial.
Actually, in her latest book published only two months ago (at the time when I was
writing this paragraph) she restricts the term “aid” to “the sum of total of both
concessional

loans

and

grants.”

90

It

is

limited

to

the

transnational

government-to-government level assistance money flows. It is a narrow sense of aid.
She uses a few sentences to describe the concept of humanitarian altruism.

But this book is not concerned with emergency and charity-based aid.
The significant sums of this type of aid that flow to Africa simply disguise
the fundamental (yet erroneous) mindset that pervades the West – that aid,
whatever its form, is a good thing. Besides, charity and emergency aids
are small beer when compared with the billions transferred each year
directly to poor countries’ governments.91

It seems that aid for Moyo is evil, no matter what its form. She thinks that aid is
leading to poverty. Aid makes the situation worse. Aid discourages development.
Because the large amount of billion dollars flooding into Africa tempts the politicians
and destroys the potential local economies. At the same time, the humanitarian aid
90
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has no contribution. It is the hypocritical actions from the West. They pretend to be
kind. But in reality it is harming the least well-off in the underdeveloped and
developing countries. It is a very radical view.
I think that Moyo overestimates the negative effects of aid. So that she reaches
the conclusion that aid is leading to poverty. She thinks that the policies on
international government-to-government grants and loans are not clear. It makes the
recipient countries confused about whether they have to return the money or not. It
tempts different camps in these countries to strive to power in order to get the free
money from the West. It produces wars and political instability. Even if these
countries have to return the money, the interest rate is too high to bear. They suffer
from the unrealistic interest rates proposed by the West. Therefore, aid actually
makes them get worse and worse. It is not the way to success. Moreover, she offers
the African countries various ways to be prosperous. She thinks they can achieve
economic success through trading and attracting more foreign direct investments.
The way forward on this view is to build a healthy and independent economy. Her
view seems to be on the side of free markets against aid activities. But they are not
actually contrary to each other. There are many other things constitute an economy,
e.g. the geographical causes, political causes, populations, literacy, technological
development etc. Her view seems to me is a partial one, with lots of bias.
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I agree with her that the international borrowing system and policies should be
executed and clarified in a better way. But I do not agree that it is the whole story of
aid, let alone the contradictory and controversial views she offered in her book. Just
as she thinks the foreign inflow of money discourages the government to raise tax,
yet low tax rate is actually the way to attract foreign investments that she calls for.
On the other hand, she believes that providing educations to the women in these
countries are useless. Say says, “never mind that they won't be able to find a job in
their own countries once they have graduated.”92 It is because they cannot work
after receiving knowledge. But it is not true that the only purpose for education is to
have a job. They can make their lives better with knowledge. They do not have to
write an essay nor publish a book, but they do learn through education.
As I see, there are many kinds of aid, but most of them are not going to make a
country prosperous. And many of them are not simply pouring money and free
resources into these desperate places. There are forms of aids concerned with
humanitarian assistance. They are helping people in emergencies. It is a life-saving
work. Some aid is focusing on building infrastructure for the better lives of the
badly-off people in a long run. Some set schools up for educating the youths, some
bring in new form of farming and use of technology and machinery, some offer free
or cheap medical care, and some introduce contraception in order to fight against
92
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overpopulation and spreading of HIV. These things are not as useless and harming as
Moyo interpreted.
All the problems Moyo presented are the problems of execution. Aid is not
wrong in its nature. These problems are actually avoidable if everything is planned
and organized well, with more closely surveillance from the watchdog agencies.
However, her radical interpretation of aid cannot refute the usefulness of aid,
especially the humanitarian aid. And her aim of economic success is for a long term
development. However, some kinds of aid are for life-saving in the emergencies,
which high-flying economy could not help immediately. Moreover, if Moyo is
correct in her view that one way of aid could not achieve the goal of relieving
poverty, this does not imply that we can do nothing more. There are ways to help and
some of them are effective. Furthermore, if aid is really harmful to the poor people, it
is morally acceptable not to give help using this kind of aid, as both Singer and
Cullity’s would agree. But we should seek other effective ways to help them rather
than stop doing anything.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion

The core question in my thesis is to see whether we have a moral obligation to
help the poor people or not: whether we, the affluent people, are morally required to
help the worse-off or not. There are some other questions that can be asked on the
issue of poverty, such as the reason for poverty and its solution. But these are not the
main problems to be addressed in this thesis. However, they are not irrelevant or not
worth answering. They are undoubtedly important and are interrelated with the main
issue. And actually there are traces of these questions in some sections of this thesis.
The current situation of poverty is massive. The poverty relief does not work
according to our expectations. It can be done better. And many people in the affluent
countries know little and give very little for helping these masses in desperate need
on the other side of the globe. Singer, therefore, argues that we are obliged to give if
saving their lives only costs us a little. He then asks whether we are wrong not to
save a drowning child in front of us or not. If we agree that we are doing wrong in
this case, it is also the same in the enduring world poverty. It is a kind of ongoing
emergencies, very much bigger than any kind of a massive disaster. In the case of
global impoverishment, we could also easily save their lives by giving out our
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surplus money not spent on basic necessities.
Then I address the criticisms raised against Singer. Some of them fail to show
their moral relevance in the attempt to reject the obligation to give. But two of them
are forceful, one is the failure of analogy, the other is the over-demandingness. For
the failure of analogy, I argue that this does not undermine the core part of Singer’s
argument. It is because I think that Singer’s argument does not necessarily depend on
the analogy. Without the analogy, Singer’s argument still works. We are required to
contribute help to the poor people. However, I argue that the over-demandingness of
principle is its fatal criticism. If we follow Singer’s advice, this could leads to a
disastrous effect. It could make the global economy collapse.
Therefore, I seek argument from other philosophers, such as Unger, O’Neill,
Murphy and Pogge. But neither of them provides a satisfactory support for our
obligation to give without any controversies. Some of them are over-demanding, and
some are counter-intuitive, some are questionable at their foundation. However, I
find that Cullity gives a very careful and reasonable argument on this. His argument
from beneficence is borrowed from Singer at the beginning, without using the
analogy. It is other people’s interests in their lives that make requirements on us to
save them. However, it would face the same fatal problem as Singer’s principle is
confronted with, which is the problem of over-demandingness. Therefore, Cullity has

- 112 -

to deal with this problem. Cullity argues the requirement of beneficence can be
extended to the interests on intrinsically life-enhancing goods as I elaborate in
Chapter 4.4. We have to help other people to pursue the life-enhancing goods which
are good for them in a long run, like friendship. This extension does not make burden
to our moral conduct. On the other hand, it helps to justify our own spending on this
kind of goods. At the same time, it avoids the miserable effect of the excessive
demandingness. It is because we are allowed to spend on something we find worth
cherishing and pursuing, beyond our basic needs. These kinds of goods are not
allowed by Singer’s principle and the Extreme Demand, as they urge us to give away
our entire surplus after spending on the basic necessities. This is a compelling
argument in that it requires us to help the poor on one hand, and allow our
development of personal integrity on the other. The broader line may be a little bit
vague without a clear cut boundary. There may be something controversial about
whether they are life-enhancing or not. But its vagueness makes it more reasonable
to be accepted. For both Cullity and Singer, they think that if you find something that
is not clear whether it is life-enhancing, we should do it first. However I would say
the vagueness does not mean that we have no idea about the life-enhancing goods.
There are many cases that are clearly far away from being included in the
life-enhancing goods. In these cases, we should give away the money spent on these
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things. We can stop or refuse to give to the poor people if by continuing the
contributions, our own pursuits of the intrinsically life-enhancing goods are
impaired.
After that in Chapter 5, I presented some further criticisms on aids. However,
these are mainly factual criticisms, which I argue, are morally irrelevant and some
are unilaterally argued. I believe that most of them can be avoided if we could have
better organized and well-planned strategies for poverty relief. These further
criticisms cannot refute the argument from beneficence presented in Chapter 4.4.
Therefore, in my conclusion, I will say that we are morally required to help the
poor people. If we do not take serious consideration and do something about the
issue, we are acting wrongly. We have to give away our money to a certain extent in
order to help relieve the worldwide poverty, as Cullity’s argument urges us to do. We
can stop giving at the point when our own pursuits of the life-enhancing goods are
harmed if we continue to give.
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